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ASSISTED SUICIDE
I. INTRODUCTION
Many courts have recognized the right to die, either by removal or
refusal of life-sustaining procedures, as an inherent right under the
constitutional right to privacy, or as part of the liberty interest com-
ponent of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Court decisions have upheld
this right for both competent and incompetent patients by honoring
an individual's interest in maintaining control over medical decisions
that affect his or her life. 2 To protect individual autonomy, most
states have enacted living will or right-to-die legislation as a process to
prospectively reject life-sustaining measures in the event of a terminal
medical condition. 3 In 1984, the Netherlands expanded the right to die
by legalizing active voluntary euthanasia, or medically assisted sui-
cide, under specific guidelines for terminally ill patients. 4 Ten years
later in November 1994, the citizens of Oregon enacted the "Oregon
Death With Dignity Act," resulting in the unprecedented legalization
of medically or physician assisted suicide in the United States.' If the
unique Oregon statute survives legal challenge, 6 the right to die in this
1. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (ma-
jority finding a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment"); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 2d 1986) (holding that a
patient has an unqualified right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
663 (N.J. 1976) (holding that the right to privacy is "broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
3. For a complete analysis and listing of all right-to-die legislation throughout the United
States, see Juliana Reno, Comment, A Little Help From My Friends: The Legal Status of As-
sisted Suicide, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1151, 1175-83 (1992) (Appendix).
4. Helga Kuhse, Ph.D., The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 14 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 145, 146 (1989) (describing Holland's highest court's decision in November 1984
providing that a doctor may practice "active voluntary euthanasia" in situations where a compe-
tent, terminally ill patient persistently requests assistance in dying).
5. Ballot Measures At a Glance, OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 1994, at B5 (showing 201,238 votes
or 51% in favor and 194,665 votes or 49% opposed to the Oregon Death With Dignity Act,
Ballot Measure 16, with 306 out of 2,300 precincts reporting). The early election returns for the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Ballot Measure 16, did not account for more than 265,000
absentee ballots or one-fifth of the vote, which were still being counted on Nov. 9, 1994. Carol
J. Castaneda, Oregon Awaiting Death- With Decision, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 1994, at 5A. On
Nov. 15, 1994, the ballot returns showed the Act approved by a magin of 32,000 votes with only
10,000 votes uncounted. Telephone Interview with Debbie Hembree, Clerk, Elections Division,
State of Oregon, Office of the Secretary of State (Nov. 15, 1994). The intended effective date for
the Act was December 8, 1994.
6. The possibility of a legal challenge to the Act was anticipated immediately after the
announcement of the election results. See, e.g.. Cynthia Hubert, New Assisted Suicide Law
Splits Oregon, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 20, 1994, at Al (reporting that "[o]pponents of Measure
16 are considering legal and legislative challenges to measure 16, but acknowledge that it will be
a tough fight"); Q&A: Doctor Assisted Suicide, OREGoNIAN, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al (referring to
comment by Robert J. Castagna, General Counsel and Executive Director of the Oregon Catho-
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country may evolve to include legal recognition of a right to medically
assisted suicide in situations where a competent person, suffering
from a terminal condition, seeks to retain control over a prolonged
dying process and select the time of his or her death. 7
Since 1990, at least seven states have attempted to legalize medically
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients, through what is generally
referred to as death with dignity legislation." With the exception of the
Oregon enactment, voters have rejected the legalization of medically
assisted suicide because of fears that assistance in death will establish
the predicate for coercion, abuse and possibly involuntary extermina-
tion of people based on a diagnosis of terminal illness. 9 Yet anecdotal
lic conference that, "while no decision has been made, opponents will use the 30-day window
allowed by law to examine legal barriers"); and Debra J. Saunders, Sharpened Pencils Ready to
Reduce High Cost of Dying, OREGoNIoAN, Nov. 17, 1994, at D13 (reporting speculation by "sui-
cide guru" Derek Humphry that "he anticipates a rapid challenge to the initiative by a patient
who is not physically capable of taking lethal pills" and the subsequent expansion of the new law
to allow lethal injections). On December 1, 1994, opponents of physician assisted suicide filed
suit in the United States District Court in Eugene, Oregon, challenging the constitutionality of
the Death With Dignity Act. Dee Lane & Spencer Heinz, Opponents of Suicide Tab OHSU,
OREGoNIAN, Dec. 2, 1994, at BI. On December 7, 1994, the federal judge granted a motion for a
temporary restraining order, postponing the effective date of the enacted statute until at least
December 19, 1994. Spencer Heinz, Assisted Suicide: Advocates Weigh In, OREGONIAN, Dec. 9,
1994, at Al. The federal judge granted a preliminary injunction on December 27, 1994, which
prohibits the application of the Death With Dignity Act until the constitutionality of the statute
is determined. Dee Lane, Suicide: Status Quo Likely, Law or Not, OREGONIAN, Dec. 29, 1994, at
Al.
7. See, e.g., Kuhse, supra note 4, at 148 (concluding that an "autonomous person may
well decide to request to die so as to avoid unnecessary suffering when terminally ill, or to avoid
the indignity of a dehumanized existence"); Timothy E. Quill, M.D. et aL., Care of the Hope-
lessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1380
(1992) (arguing that "it is not idiosyncratic, selfish, or indicative of a psychiatric disorder for
people with an incurable illness to want some control over how they die"); Julia Pugliese, Note,
Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINos L.J.
1291, 1329 (1993) (stating that "assisted suicide is the next logical step in granting patients the
right of self-determination"); Dick Lehr, Physicians Face Wrenching Choices, Requests for Help
in Dying Produce a Professional Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1993, at I [hereinafter Lehr,
Wrenching Choices] (reporting that Charles H. Baron, law professor at Boston College, is work-
ing with others to draft a model bill allowing physician-assisted suicide "in the hopes that this
will make relief from suffering more readily available and in a less discriminatory fashion and
with greater patient autonomy").
8. The states were California, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Washington.
Lehr, Wrenching Choices, supra note 7, at 1 (also reporting that the legislatures in Connecticut
and Wisconsin were drafting similar proposals but none had been introduced as of Apr. 27,
1993). The seventh state to attempt legislation was Michigan, in 1991. For a detailed analysis of
the Michigan bills, see Frank C. Zischerk, Jr., Comment, Michigan's Proposed Assisted Suicide
Legislation: Strong Public Policy or Legislative Rhetoric?, 69 U. DET. MERcy L. REv. 33 (1991).
9. B.D. Colen, Campaign 92 Initiatives: California Is Voting on the Right to Die Act,
Would Legalize Some Forms of Mercy Killing, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992, at 23 (reporting on
voter opposition to physician assisted suicide in California); see infra notes 188-222 and accom-
panying text (discussing arguments in opposition to medically assisted suicide in relation to
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reports in newspapers throughout the United States indicate that more
often than one realizes, a person suffering from a terminal illness
chooses to end a prolonged decline into death and seeks assistance in
executing such a decision.' 0 Many of the accounts of assisted suicide
involve people suffering from acquired immune deficiency syndrome
or AIDS." The chronic debilitation, extensive suffering and fatality of
AIDS places persons with this disease in the forefront of the debate
regarding assisted death. The Boston Globe published the comment of
a person diagnosed with AIDS who considered physician assisted sui-
cide as an option to "avoid declining into 'an emaciated lump in a
wheelchair, babbling and drooling and wetting my pants.""I
While personal comments and accounts provide impassioned sup-
port for the legalization of assisted suicide, opponents' concerns are
intensified in the context of persons with AIDS. The cost of health
care, the social attitude toward HIV infection and AIDS, and the pre-
AIDS patients); see also Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63-64 (Cal. App. 2d
1992) (providing general discussion of state's legitimate interests in protecting society against
abuses inherent in assisted suicide situations); Willard Gaylin, M.D. et al., 'Doctors Must Not
Kill,' 259 JAMA 2139, 2140 (1988) (postulating that physician assisted suicide could occur with
"dispensable" patients who never request such an option).
10. In 1993 the Boston Globe published three articles in a series detailing the actions of
several physicians who assisted patients in suicide and individuals who sought the help of friends
when physicians were unwilling to provide such assistance. Lehr, Wrenching Choices, supra note
7, at 1; Dick Lehr, Death & the Doctor's Hand, Increasingly, Secretly, Physicians Are Helping
the Incurably Ill to Die, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1993, at I [hereinafter Lehr, Physicians Are
Helping]; and Dick Lehr, More Learn of a Practice Long Hidden, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26,
1993, at 1 [hereinafter Lehr, Long Hidden Practicel. The San Francisco Chronicle reported the
assisted suicide of Steven Shiflett who was dying of AIDS. Lori Olszewski, One Man's Choice!
Assisted Suicide Didn't Turn Out as AIDS Patient Planned, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, at Al.
Also, the participation of Dr. Jack Kevorkian in 21 suicides provides additional anecdotes of
assisted suicides in this country. Carol J. Castaneda, Kevorkian Attends 20th Suicide, Oppo-
nents Stress 'Other Answers,' USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1993, at 3A. Kevorkian Helps Another
Suicide As Ban Expires, Woman in 'Unending Pain' Is 21st He Has Assisted, ARIZONA REPUB-
LIC, Nov. 27, 1994, at A3 [hereinafter Kevorkian Helps). These are only a few examples of the
reported incidents of assisted suicide in the United States.
11. See, e.g., Stephen Braun, Deliver Them From AIDS, L.A. Tnms, Aug. 28, 1988, at f
(describing the participation of Marty James, a gay-rights activist, in the assisted suicides of
several men with AIDS); Daniel Golden, A Time to Die, Increasingly, the Terminally 1ll Are
Turning to Suicide Out of Horror at the Expensive, Intrusive, Lonely, Prolonged Nightmare that
So-Called Natural Death Has Become, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1990, at 16 (reporting on the
assisted suicide of "Dean," a man dying of AIDS); Olszewski, supra note 10, at Al (reporting
the assisted suicide of Steven Shiflet who was dying of AIDS); Tim Rutten, Who Will Have the
Last Word on Death with Dignity?, L.A. TrsEs, Oct. 15, 1992, at I (describing the suicide of
Ian, terminally ill with AIDS, who was assisted by two friends). Please note that this Article uses
the full description "person or persons with AIDS" rather than the acronym "PWA" because
such abbreviations dehumanize the suffering and impugn the dignity of people who live with this
disease.
12. Lehr, Wrenching Choices, supra note 7, at 1 (reporting the comment of Keri Duran,
gay activist).
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liminary stage of medical research in this area create a heightened pos-
sibility for persons with AIDS to contemplate suicide regardless of the
stage of their disease progression. 3 The legalization of physician assis-
tance in such decisions may make suicide an expectation for persons
with AIDS rather than a legal and voluntary option. Thus, AIDS fuels
valid fears on both sides of the debate regarding medically assisted
suicide and also provides a context for assessing the merit of legalizing
such an option.
This Article proposes that AIDS is both a compelling impetus for
medical assistance in death and a mandate for safeguards to protect
against the potential for coercion and abuse associated with medically
assisted suicide legislation. Part II of this Article presents a general
discussion of medically assisted suicide and the degree of public sup-
port for such an option. Part III concentrates on the relationship be-
tween AIDS and medically assisted suicide through a brief overview of
the progression of AIDS and the related treatments; statistical evi-
dence of a correlation between persons with AIDS and assisted sui-
cide; and accounts of persons with AIDS who ended their lives with
the assistance of others. Part IV discusses the constitutional basis for
a right to assisted death and concludes that courts should uphold a
statute providing such a right, 4 under precedent recognizing the right
to refuse or remove life-sustaining measures. Part V presents argu-
ments in opposition to medically assisted death and formulates a para-
digm of concerns related to persons with AIDS which must be
addressed in any legislative proposal. Part VI evaluates attempted leg-
islation in Washington, California and Maine, followed by an assess-
ment of the enacted Oregon statute and the application of these
proposals to persons with AIDS. Finally, Section VII presents a model
death with dignity statute which provides specific protections for per-
sons with AIDS.
II. MEDICALLY ASSISTED SUICIDE
The concept of legalizing medically assisted suicide runs counter to
the basic ideal of modern health care, which operates to extend life as
13. See infra notes 188-222 and accompanying text (presenting arguments in opposition to
medical assistance in death).
14. Throughout this Article, the "right" to assisted suicide means the ability to legally seek
and receive assistance in hastening one's death. The "right" is based upon a person's subjective
decision to end his or her life with the assistance of a willing physician, just as the person in a
"right-to-die" situation makes a decision to remove or refuse life-sustaining treatment.
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long as possible. Nevertheless, some people afflicted with protracted,
irreversible and terminal illnesses seek assistance through medication
in order to die peacefully and without pain when they can no longer
endure the suffering associated with the natural course of dying."
Medically assisted suicide entails the assistance by a physician,
through either prescribing or administering an overdose of sedative
medication, when a person decides to terminate his or her life.' 6 In-
creased individual exposure to the "lingering death of a loved one" as
a consequence of life-sustaining treatment has fostered public support
for medically assisted death.17 Many people seek an earlier alternative
to refusing life-prolonging measures in a hospital setting.
A 1986 survey of 1,998 Americans revealed that 62% of men and
63% of women "agreed that doctors should 'end the patient's life if
there is no hope of recovery and the patient requests it.""'  Also,
court decisions and right-to-die legislation in many states have forever
altered the relationship between physician and patient. 9 No longer is
the physician the sole arbiter in deciding the correct treatment for an
individual patient. 20 The patient now has equal authority with the phy-
15. David Orentlicher, M.D., J.D., Ethics & Health Policy Counsel, Physician Participa-
tion in Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844 (1989) (describing that many patients request physician
assistance in executing an earlier death due to "intolerable suffering with no prospect of im-
provement").
16. This Article focuses on medically assisted suicide which involves physician participation
by either administering a lethal dose of pain medication, such as morphine or other barbiturates,
or prescribing a lethal dose for the patient's own administration. Many terms have been used to
describe this type of suicide which may appear in sources used in this Article. For example, the
term active euthanasia often is used to describe physician-administered overdoses of medication
at the patient's request. See George D. Lundberg, M.D., 'It's Over, Debbie' and the Euthanasia
Debate, 259 JAMA 2142, 2143 (1988) (defining the different types of euthanasia including pas-
sive, semipassive, semiactive, accidental, suicidal, and active). Rational suicide describes a re-
quest from a competent patient to end a terminal illness that results in a prolonged and
protracted death. For an explanation of rational suicide, see the decision in Michigan v. Kevor-
kian, 62 U.S.L.W. 2411, 2412 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993) (defining rational suicide as a
decision by a competent person to end his or her life in a reasonable response to a condition that
is causing the quality of life to be significantly impaired). These are but a few examples of the
terms used to describe assisted suicide by a competent person who is suffering from a terminal
illness or condition.
17. Diane M. Giannelli, A Right to Die: Debate Intensifies Over Euthanasia and the Doc-
tor's Role, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 7, 1991, at 9; see also Greg Gajus, Editorial, 'We Died Peace-
fully, Held By His Friends.' MtAmu HERALD, June 13, 1992, at 23A (describing his friend's
physical decline following AIDS diagnosis, which included blisters in his mouth, emaciation to
75 pounds, continuous pain and emotional despair).
18. Marilyn Lewis & Chris Christoff, AIDS Fuels Euthanasia Debate, Terminally Ill Press
Demand for Legal Right to Die, DIET. FREE PREss, Nov. 22, 1987, at 17A (describing a poll
conducted by Roper Organization, Inc. for the Hemlock Society).
19. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of patient auton-
omy in medical decisions).
20. Ronnie Scheier, Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Decides?, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 7, 1991,
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sician in treatment selection and rejection, if the patient so chooses. 2'
The publicized participation of Michigan physician, Dr. Jack Ke-
vorkian in twenty-one suicides 2l is a blatant example of recurrent phy-
sician assistance in suicide, and also a basis for heightened concerns
regarding the secret implementation of such requests .23 Other physi-
cians comprehend the agony associated with a prolonged death from a
terminal disease and assist their terminally ill patients in committing
suicide through medication overdoses.24 A 1988 University of Colo-
rado poll of approximately 2,000 physicians revealed that more than
half "said euthanasia would have been justified for some of their pa-
tients" and a third "said they had actually given pain medication they
knew would hasten a patient's death.' '25 People suffering from cancer,
and more recently AIDS, constitute the majority of patients who con-
sult their physicians about the possibility of assisted suicide. 26
III. THE RLATIONsml' BETWEEN AIDS AND ASsISTED SUICIDE
The mortality rate for persons with AIDS in the United States at the
end of 1991 was 64.8%, which equaled 133,554 deaths from the dis-
ease, out of 206,171 Americans with reported AIDS diagnoses. The
three-year mortality rate from the time of confirmed diagnosis ap-
proaches 90%.n The association between AIDS and assisted suicide
21. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 382 (Cal. 1993) (explaining that in treatment
decisions "effectuating the patient's freedom of choice remains the ultimate arbiter").
22. Kevorkian Helps, supra note 10, at A3 (reporting that Kevorkian assisted in a twenty-
first suicide on November 26, 1994, involving a 72-year-old woman inflicted with severe rheuma-
toid arthritis, advanced osteoporosis and other disorders).
23. Jennifer A. Zima, Assisted Suicide: Society's Response to a Plea for Relief or A Simple
Solution to the Cries of the Needy?, 23 RuTGERs L. Rav. 387 (1992) (describing Dr. Kevorkian's
assistance in the death of Janet Adkins through the use of his "suicide machine," which intrave-
nously infused a mixture of saline solution, pain killer and potassium chloride, in the back of a
Volkswagen bus parked in a public campground).
24. Lehr, Wrenching Choices, supra note 7, at I (reporting examples of anonymous physi-
cian-assisted suicide in the Boston area); see also Richard Knox, 1 in 5 Doctors Say They As-
sisted a Patient's Death, Survey Finds, BosTOw GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1992, at 5 (reporting the results
of several surveys of physicians in the United States who deliberately assisted in the death of
their patients).
25. Patrick Cooke, The Gentle Death, 3 HE'socRaTms 50 (1989).
26. Lehr, Physicians Are Helping, supra note 10, at I (reporting that cancer and AIDS
provide the most common context for assisted death requests).
27. CDC, HIV/AIDS Surveillance 1, 13 (Feb. 1992) (referring to Table 8, AIDS cases, case-
fatality rates and deaths in the United States through Jan. 1992); see also SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT TO ThE AMIsucAN PUBLIC ON HIV INFEcTioN AND AIDS, 1, 24 (1993) [hereinafter 1993
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT] (reporting that by the end of 1992 more than 170,000 Americans
had died as a result of AIDS, and the total number of AIDS cases rose to 253,448).
28. Paul A. Volberding, M.D. et a., Zidovudine in Asymptomatic Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus Infection, 322 NEw ENo. J. MED. 941, 948 n.6, 949 n.7 (1990) (referring to a study
conducted in New York, in 1987, of the clinical progression of 5833 AIDS cases, and a 1988
study, in San Francisco, of the survival patterns of the first 500 patients with AIDS).
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goes beyond these dismal statistics. Because AIDS encompasses a
group of diseases and conditions resulting from severe immuno-
suppression, infected patients experience the ravages of many debili-
tating illnesses and a recurrent cycle of infirmity and intermittent
recovery.29 A basic overview of the most common afflictions of AIDS
patients provides insight into the choice of assisted suicide by many
people suffering from the disease.
A. The Manifestation of HIV and AIDS: Diseases and Treatment
Upon initial infection with the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV),30 an individual usually experiences a flu-like illness with fever,
chills, and general malaise. 1 Although no external symptoms may oc-
cur, HIV invades a specific type of T-cells, CD4+ T-lymphocytes,
which normally activate the immune system to ward off invading in-
fections.12 Although a person may remain HIV-positive for seven to
ten years before exhibiting symptoms associated with HIV infection or
an AIDS diagnosis," infection with HIV is incurable and eventually
fatal. The objective of medical treatment for HIV infection is to fore-
stall the decline in health associated with T-cell destruction by the vi-
rus and a subsequent AIDS diagnosis.3 4 Early treatment with
29. Gina Kolata, How AIDS Smolders: Immune System Studies Follow the Tracks of
H.. V., N.Y. Tnams, Mar. 17, 1992, at Cl; see also Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/AIDS: Medi-
cal Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW I (Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed.
1992) (defining AIDS and referencing the initial reports of unusual opportunistic infections ob-
served in homosexuals in 1981). The Federal Center for Disease Control and Prevention uses the
following criteria for assessing HIV infection in persons 13 years or older:
a) repeatedly reactive screening tests for HIV antibody (e.g., enzyme immunoassay)
with specific antibody identified by the use of supplemental tests (e.g., Western blot,
immunofluorescence assay); b) direct identification of virus in host tissues by virus
isolation; c) HIV antigen detection; or d) a positive result on any other highly specific
licensed test for HIV.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Ex-
panded Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MosnIr & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. No. RR-17 1, 2 (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter CDC, 1993 Revised Classification].
30. 1993 SuRGEON GEsERALu'S PEPORT, supra note 27, at 6 (explaining that HIV is transmit-
ted through exposure to blood, semen, and perinatally from mother to fetus).
31. Kolatasupra note 29, at Cl.
32. Macher, supra note 29, at 4.
33. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MoRDWIDT & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 35, 17, 29 (Jan. 17, 1986) (reporting that the time from HIV exposure
to the diagnosis of AIDS may extend as long as seven years); see also Kolata, supra note 29, at
Cl (reporting that the span between HIV infection and AIDS diagnosis ranges from two to ten
years).
34. Volberding, supra note 28, at 942; see also Macher, supra note 29, at 16 (stating that
"treatment with AZT may increase a patient's survival time by delaying further deterioration of
the immune system"). For a definition and description of AIDS diagnoses, see infra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
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zidovudine (AZT) reduces the progression from HIV infection to
AIDS diagnosis by directly inhibiting the replication or manufacture
of HIV in the immune system.35 Zidovudine treatment must be closely
monitored to avoid adverse effects such as anemia, blood disorders,
and liver dysfunction.3 6 Even though the interval between HIV infec-
tion and clinical diagnosis increases with zidovudine treatment, the
overall survival rate of eighteen months from the time of AIDS diag-
nosis is unaltered. Additionally, many AIDS patients may experience
serious adverse reactions to the drug.37
Clinical diagnosis of AIDS is based upon the presence of specific
opportunistic infections which generally occur as a result of severe im-
munosuppression. 31 For example, Kaposi's sarcoma, a skin cancer cre-
ating purple lesions on the skin, and pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
are indicators of the decline in the immune system function and
heightened susceptibility to infections that are otherwise uncommon in
the general population. 39 The Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) also classifies AIDS cases in part according to a T-cell
count below 200 cells per microliter of blood.4 Physicians and HIV-
positive individuals monitor the T-cell count to assess the degree of
immunosuppression and associated vulnerability to opportunistic in-
fections. The most common opportunistic infection afflicting HIV-
positive individuals is pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), "occur-
ring at some point in at least 85 percent of patients. ' 41 Physicians
35. John D. Hamilton et al., A Controlled Trial of Early Versus Late Treatment with Zido-
vudine in Symptomatic Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 437,
442 (1990). Zidovudine was formerly referred to as antiretroviral zidovudine or AZT. Macher,
supra note 29, at 16. Zidovudine treatment is recommended for both asymptomatic and early
HIV infection when the T-cell count is less than 500 cells per microliter of blood. Volberding,
supra note 28, at 947.
36. Volberding, supra note 28, at 946 (demonstrating significant decreases in the rate of
AIDS diagnosis in HIV-infected patients who receive both low doses of zidovudine-500 milli-
grams per day-and high-doses of 1500 milligrams per day).
37. Hamilton, supra note 35, at 442.
38. 1993 SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.
39. Id.
40. CDC, 1993 Revised Classification, supra note 29, at 2 (chart showing that the revised
classification now requires reporting for any individual with a CD4+ T-cell count of less than
200 cells per microliter of blood, even if the underlying HIV infection is asymptomatic, effective
Jan. 1, 1993). The T-cell count in a healthy person is typically in the range of 1000 cells per
microliter of blood. David W. Webber, 1994 Cumulative Supplement, in AIDS AND THE LAW 1,
10 (Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1994).
41. Margaret M.E. Schneider, M.D. et al., A Controlled Trial of Aerosolized Pentamidine
or Trimethoprim-Sulfamethoxazole as Primary Prophylaxis Against Pneumocystis Carinii Pneu-
monia in Patients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1836
(1992) (study comparing results of pentamidine and co-trimoxazole treatment with PCP infec-
tions). For a definition of PCP infections, see Macher, supra note 29, at 15.
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treat PCP infections with antibiotics to minimize the onset of respira-
tory difficulties, but the treatment itself may result in low-grade fever,
nausea and vomiting. 2
An HIV-positive individual typically suffers not only from the pro-
gressive complications of HIV infection, but also from the many ad-
verse reactions associated with the treatment of secondary infections.
Beyond the recurrence of opportunistic infections that may be mini-
mized by treatment, HIV-positive individuals are also susceptible to
AIDS related mental illnesses, categorized under the general term
AIDS dementia complex.4 3 Perhaps the most feared complication of
HIV infection, AIDS dementia may occur before physical symptoms
warrant an actual AIDS diagnosis. 4 Clinical studies suggest that 50%
to 70% of HIV-positive and AIDS patients will develop an organic
mental disorder during the course of their illness.4 1 Patients with
AIDS dementia complex experience abnormalities in their memory ca-
pability, motor skills, and behavior patterns.46 As a result of these im-
pairments, a person may be unable to continue in his or her
employment, and may experience a growing apathy toward social and
recreational activities.4 7 The likelihood of impairment or incompe-
tency in the course of HIV infection instills in many AIDS patients a
fear of loosing control of their affairs, and raises serious concerns
about the requisites for medically assisted suicide legislation.48
Following symptoms of HIV infection or confirmation through
testing, an HIV-positive individual engages in a constant vigil, moni-
toring such indicators as the T-cell level, weight loss, any changes in
memory or motor abilities, and the advent of associated opportunistic
infections. 49 This constant, personal health assessment must -also in-
42. Schneider, supra note 41, at 1840 (referring to Table 3 entitled "Adverse Reactions
Requiring Discontinuation of the Study Drug" including pentamidine and co-trimoxazole). Re-
search indicates that co-trimoxazole can forestall PCP infection and possibly other types of op-
portunistic infections which target the respiratory systems of HIV-infected individuals. Id. at
1839-40.
43. John Parry, Life Services Planning for Persons With AIDS-Related Mental Illnesses, 13
MENTAL & PfrsIcAi DISABILITY L. REP. 82 (Mar.-Apr. 1989).
44. Richard W. Price et al., The Brain in AIDS: Central Nervous System HIV-I Infection
and AIDS Dementia Complex, 239 Sci. 586 (1988). This medical study indicates that HIV infec-
tion of the central nervous system "is relatively common and may even be the rule" in the early,
asymptomatic stage of HIV infection. Id. at 588.
45. Parry, supra note 43, at 82.
46. Price, supra note 44, at 586.
47. Id. at 587.
48. See Parry, supra note 43, at 82 (explaining that "[miost, if not all, of the results of
decisions made by persons with AIDS dementia complex will be affected by their legal compe-
tency to make decisions").
49. Beyond the cellular infection of CD4 + T-cells, HIV often targets macrophages or
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clude close monitoring for any adverse effects caused by AIDS-related
medication. This description is only a general characterization of the
hardships associated with HIV-infection, but nevertheless provides in-
sight into the attitudes and frustrations of many people infected with
HIV, who are both knowledgeable of the progression of the disease,
and aware of the clinical episodes that indicate an irreversible decline
into full-blown AIDS.
B. Incidence of Suicide Among Persons with AIDS: Statistical
Evidence
National statistics show that the incidence of suicide for persons
with AIDS is remarkably high in comparison to the suicide rate for
the general population. 0 Several clinical studies indicate that persons
with AIDS may have a heightened tendency to contemplate either in-
dividual or assisted suicide. In 1985, a Cornell University Medical
College study demonstrated that the likelihood of suicide in men with
AIDS was sixty six times greater than that of the general population."
The study warned health care professionals to assess patients diag-
nosed with AIDS, significantly affecting men at that time, for signs of
suicidal inclinations, and to recommend counseling to prevent future
attempts.52 Although the Cornell University study was the first docu-
mented assessment of suicide in persons with AIDS, the results sug-
clean-up cells that move throughout the body, thereby infiltrating different organ systems. Mar-
sha F. Goldsmith, Physicians at AMA Amsterdam News Seminar Offer Panoramic View of
Their Varied Roles in Pandemic, 268 JAMA 1237 (1992). For example, HIV-infected macro-
phages may move to the lidney, causing renal insufficiency, or to the bone marrow, resulting in
blood disorders and anemia. Id. at 1239. When HIV targets intestinal cells, these cells become
hypersecretory causing "clean diarrhea" for which no bacterial or viral cause can be identified.
Id. Other complications, such as persistent oral thrush, recurrent herpes zoster, and pelvic in-
flammatory disease, are also associated with HIV infection. CDC, 1993 Revised Classfication,
supra note 29, at 3-4.
50. Golden, supra note 11, at 16 (providing general information regarding CDC statistics
on national suicide and occurrence in AIDS patients). For a general assessment of the occurrence
of all forms of euthanasia from 1985 until 1991, see Stacy L. Mojica & Dan S. Murrell, The
Right to Choose- When Should Death Be in the Individual's Hands?, 12 Wff-rnaT L. REv. 471,
485-87 (1991) (explaining that "[n]inety-seven percent of all murder/suicides, almost 90% of
double suicides, 71% of assisted suicides and 72% of all mercy killings have occurred since
1980") (footnotes omitted).
51. Peter M. Marzuk et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons With AIDS, 259 JAMA
1333 (1988) (reporting a study involving 3828 reported AIDS cases in New York City during 1985
out of which 12 suicides in men between the ages of 20 to 59 occurred).
52. Id. at 1337 (recognizing that the number of actual suicides by persons with AIDS was
low, but also suggesting that because of the high rate of under-diagnosis of the disease at the
time of this study, additional suicides could possibly be related to AIDS).
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gest that AIDS is a significant risk factor for suicide.3 A 1989 report
of civilian applicants for military service also noted a higher occur-
rence of suicide in HIV-positive individuals.14
Research in the Netherlands provides additional information re-
garding the incidence of assisted suicide among AIDS patients. Active
voluntary euthanasia, or medically assisted suicide, has occurred in
the Netherlands under specific guidelines since at least 1984.11 To be
eligible for medically assisted suicide, a patient must make an endur-
ing uncoerced request for a lethal overdose of pain medication, and
must suffer from severe physical or mental pain without hope of re-
lief.16 In 1990, the Remmelink Commission conducted the most defini-
tive study of the prevalence of assisted suicide among persons with
AIDS in the Netherlands.57 The Commission interviewed 405 physi-
cians and reviewed the circumstances of 7,000 deaths to produce relia-
ble estimates of the incidence of euthanasia and other end-of-life
decisions in that country.5" The study revealed that "between 10 and
20 percent of all deaths among terminal AIDS patients involve eutha-
nasia or assisted suicide." 59
In 1991, a smaller study conducted by the Netherlands Institute of
Mental Health reported a similar incidence of assisted suicide in AIDS
53. Richard M. Glass, M.D., AIDS and Suicide, 259 JAMA 1369 (1988) (recognizing that
this study is the first epidemiologic documentation of the relationship betweea AIDS and sui-
cide).
54. Andrew V. Dannenberg, M.D., et al. Mortality Among 1862 HIV-Antibody-Positive
Civilian Applicants for Military Service: Preliminary Results, 321 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1267
(1989) (reporting that preliminary data on military applicants from October 1986 through De-
cember 1987 were insufficient to calculate death rates from specific causes, but showing that 3
out of 1862 HIV-positive applicants committed suicide as compared to 2 out of 5583 HIV-nega-
tive applicants).
55. Kuhse, supra note 4, at 146 (describing Holland's highest court's decision in November
1984 that a doctor may practice "active voluntary euthanasia" in situations where a competent,
terminally ill patient persistently requests assistance in dying).
56. Cooke, supra note 25, at 5.
57. Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the
End of Life, 338 LANCET 669 (1991) (presenting the first results of the Dutch nationwide study
on euthanasia and other end-of-life decisions established by Prof. J. Remmelink, attorney gen-
eral of the Dutch high court in 1990).
58. Id.
59. Maurice de Wachter, A.M., HAsrnas CENTER RP. Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 2 (describing
the more detailed aspects of the study regarding four special categories of patients and end-of-
life decisions, including severely defective newborns, children with fatal diseases, psychiatric pa-
tients, and patients with AIDS). A 1992 report at the Eighth International Conference on AIDS
in Amsterdam indicated that 2200 persons have been diagnosed with AIDS in the Netherlands.
Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 1244 (including a comment by Pieter L. Meenhorst, M.D., Ph.D,
head of the AIDS unit in the Slotervaart Medical Center in Amsterdam, that "the Dutch com-
mission estimates that as many as 20% of all AIDS patients die as a result of euthanasia").
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patients.60 This study involved "in-depth structured interviews [of] 59
relatives of deceased AIDS patients," to assess the occurrence of eu-
thanasia for these patients under the Dutch system. Although the
study did not indicate the actual number of AIDS patients involved, it
did provide informative data regarding the frequency of euthanasia
requests and related deaths. The study revealed that "euthanasia was
discussed by 60 percent of all patients, mainly because of their fear of
dementia and physical deterioration." 6' AIDS patients died from se-
lected euthanasia in 23% of the cases investigated.62 From these find-
ings, the authors concluded that "[e]uthanasia is a major theme for
people with AIDS. '63 These clinical studies show that both suicide
and assistance in suicide are significant considerations for persons
with AIDS. Beyond clinical studies and general statistics, the accounts
of several individuals with AIDS who either contemplated or actually
died as a result of assisted suicide evidence not only the occurrence of
such acts, but also autobiographical details of the circumstances lead-
ing to these difficult decisions.
C. Personal Accounts of Assisted Suicide by Persons with AIDS
The story of Dr. Stephen Yarnell, a psychiatrist diagnosed with
AIDS, illustrates the plans of many people affected with this disease. 4
60. C. Mead et al., AIDS, Euthanasia and Grief, AIDS WEEKLY, July, 22, 1991, at 16
(article presented at the Seventh International Conference on AIDS in Florence, Italy, June 16-
21, 1991). A newspaper report in 1987 included a comment by a Dr. Sven Danner, head of the
AIDS unit at Amsterdam's Academic Medical Center, who "estimated this week that at least 12
of his hospital's 97 AIDS patients who have died were killed by lethal injections administered by
physicians." Doug Cosper, In Netherlands, Some AIDS Patients Choosing Euthanasia, Doctors
Say, PAwIA, INQUMER, Apr. 2, 1987, at A3.
61. Mead, supra note 60, at 16. For a general overview of the physical manifestations of
HIV infection and AIDS, see Macher, supra note 29, at 5-15. In 1987, a group of 19 British
doctors supported voluntary euthanasia for well-informed AIDS patients who seek to "end their
lives rather than face mental and physical deterioration in the final stages of the disease." AIDS
Euthanasia Option Advocated, PtnnA. INQUMER, Nov. 14, 1987, at C8. The doctors stated that
the AIDS epidemic increased the need for euthanasia because "more people now survive to suf-
fer the sort of physical and psychological distress which cannot be adequately relieved even by
the best medical and hospice care." Id.
62. Mead, supra note 60, at 16.
63. Id. In June 1993, Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, held a seminar in
San Francisco providing information to more than 150 people orr the "drugs to use for suicide,
how to avoid a botched attempt and whether to involve their loved ones and doctors." Hemlock
Society Holds Seminar for Those Diagnosed with AIDS, STAR TaRn. (San Francisco), June 21,
1993, at 7A. Most of the 150 people who attended were gay men with AIDS. Humphry com-
mented: "If people are revolted by what I'm saying and doing, then we must change the law."
Id. Humphry included a "demonstration of how to use a plastic bag and a rubber band for self-
asphyxiation." Id.
64. Lewis & Christoff, supra note 18, at 17A (stating that interest in changing the law
against assisted suicide in California is growing as "AIDS condemns outspoken people like Yar-
nell, 44, to the prospect of grim, wasting deaths").
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In 1987, Yarnell refused to explain the actual mechanics of his
planned death, but indicated that he had a "cache of barbiturates" in
sufficient quantity to kill himself.6 5 He was already monitoring the
damage done to his brain by AIDS through periodic psychological
testing. Yarnell viewed the option of assisted suicide as "no more than
a chance to die with dignity."6
In 1990, a similar article in the Boston Globe chronicled the suicide
of a man dying from AIDS, named "Dean. 6 7 Dean tested positive
for HIV in 1984 and expected to die shortly thereafter. Contrary to
his fears, Dean showed no ill effects until 1989, when he experienced a
six-month episode of diarrhea, an indication that severe immuno-
suppression had commenced.6 Although he started to contemplate su-
icide at this time, Dean pursued experimental treatments and gained
renewed hope of tolerating the secondary diseases associated with
AIDS. But in 1990, Dean was hospitalized for pneumonia and toxo-
plasmosis. 9 The medications he took "sapped his energy and made
him so nauseated that he had to reduce the dosages." 70 He wrote a
living will prospectively refusing artificial life support, gave a friend
power of attorney to ensure that his wishes would be followed, and
arranged his own memorial service . 7 With the final details in place,
Dean started researching suicide as a "practical option." 72 He con-
tacted a physician who was also a personal friend and obtained a
"prescription for a fatal dose of medication."7 Many months later,
Dean's condition continued to deteriorate: "[hie has continued to lose
weight, his right side is partially paralyzed, and the slightest move-
ment or speech is difficult for him. " 74 The reporter concluded the arti-
cle with a quote by Dean and a reference to his final act of suicide:
'I take the pills, then I'll sleep.' That night, he did.""
65. Id. (Dr. Yarnell also evidenced concern about the involvement of other people in his
planned suicide because the "law says it's a felony punishable by five years in prison for a
person to aid or abet a suicide").
66. Id.
67. Golden, supra note 11, at 16 (also reporting that several terminally ill people followed
similar planning patterns for their own suicides).
68. Id. (also reporting that as Dean waited for the illness to begin, he watched many of his
friends succumb to AIDS and stated: "I'd pose in front of the mirror and say to myself, 'You
look great, but you're rotting inside").
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (describing how Dean discussed his intended suicide with his parents, who indicated
their resignation to respect his wishes and their desire not to be involved with his decision).
75. Id.
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In 1992, The San Francisco Chronicle reported the final hours of
Steven Shiflett as he executed the plan for his assisted suicide. 76 Steven
was dying of AIDS: he could only make out blurred images when he
looked at people with his "disease-ridden" eyes; he had to wear dia-
pers because constant diarrhea made him so weak that he could not
physically travel to the bathroom; and eventually he was reduced to
swallowing a teaspoon of olive oil periodically for nutrition because
his body no longer absorbed nutrients from his intravenous fluids. 7
Realizing the protracted aspect of his death from AIDS, Steven set the
date for his suicide.7 8 In a brown bag labeled "euthanasia kit," Steven
had assembled several vials of medication and a plastic garbage bag to
put over his head if he underestimated the dosage of the drugs re-
quired to end his life.79 Steven wanted to be asleep when the fatal
drugs were injected, and asked a friend, who was HIV-positive, to
administer the lethal dose.10
On the chosen night, Steven held a living wake to celebrate his
death with close friends. After saying good-bye, Steven retired to his
bedroom and consumed a large number of sleeping pills and morphine
to induce sleep. 8 The carefully crafted plan went awry because Stev-
en's diseased digestive system was incapable of absorbing the oral
medication, thus precluding his ability to fall asleep. To further com-
plicate the situation, Steven's "assistant" was startled by an unan-
nounced visitor in the bedroom and abandoned Steven after injecting
only a portion of the lethal dosage.Y2 The friends remaining in the
apartment made a panicked call to Steven's physician for advice on
how to proceed. Confronted with an extremely difficult situation, the
doctor chose to assist. The article described his troubled recollections:
Steven had been very clear with me about what he wanted ... so I
told them how to finish what had been started. It crossed the line for
76. Olszewski, supra note 10, at Al (reporting that the article was the beginning of a two-
part series on the euthanasia movement in the United States, including the account of Steven
Shiflett's assisted suicide and a discussion of Proposition 161, which would legalize "physician
aid in dying").
77. Id.
78. Id. (recounting Shiflett's impression of his existence one week before he died: "I drip
and I shit. That is my life now").
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (explaining that this situation is commonly called a "botched" attempt at assisted
suicide).
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me; I was involved way more than I wanted to be. It should have
remained just between Steve and me. When I hung up the phone, I
thought "Oh my God, I just helped kill somebody." But Steven was
going to be dead in a week or two. Steven was looking to shorten his
death, not to shorten his life."3
One of Steven's friends administered the remainder of the lethal medi-
cation and shortly thereafter, Steven died. His cause of death was
listed in the city record as AIDS and related infections.8 5
Finally, in 1993 the Boston Globe published the account of a Bos-
ton physician who assisted the suicide of a man with AIDS. 6 A forty-
seven year-old man contacted the physician, fictitiously referred to in
the article as Dr. Green, to obtain a lethal prescription of pills. Ini-
tially resistant to the idea of assisted suicide, Dr. Green consulted a
psychiatrist who determined that the man "was not depressed, but
steady and rational.''87 Dr. Green learned that the patient had lived
with AIDS for five years and had become so weak that he could no
longer get out of the house. The patient was not in intractable pain or
near death at this time, but he did suffer from fatigue, loss of appe-
tite, and infections.88 The man explained that his interest in suicide
arose out of a need to control his life when its quality was diminishing
so rapidly.8 9 After the man suffered a period of confusion and para-
noia one evening, Dr. Green decided to prescribe a month's supply of
barbiturates and a potent pain narcotic.9 A few days later, the man
swallowed all of the medication and, surrounded by his friends, died
peacefully while Dr. Green waited patiently in another part of the
house. 9'
. These are a only a few examples of the personal accounts of assisted
suicide by people with AIDS that have been published in newspapers.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lehr, Physicians Are Helping, supra note 10, at 1 (also reporting on other physicians
who assisted in the suicides of terminally ill patients).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Not all accounts of assisted suicide occur by ingestion or injection of lethal doses of
pain medication. In January 1990, hospital officials at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los An-
geles reported a murder-suicide involving an AIDS patient and his male companion. Kenneth J.
Garcia & Victor F. Zonana, AIDS-Suicide Link Worries Health Professionals, L.A. Tnrss, Jan.
6, 1990, at 1. Steven Charles Jenkins was dying of AIDS in the hospital. His companion entered
the hospital room and shot Jenkins "through the head before turning the gun on himself." Id.
Hospital officials believed that the tragedy involved a secret suicide pact. Id.
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The accounts describe the decisions of four men to control the time of
death rather than wait to naturally succumb to AIDS. Every example
includes some form of assistance by a physician, either by unknow-
ingly prescribing pain medication which the patient accumulated for a
future suicide, or actively participating in the circumstances of the pa-
tient's death. Advocates of medically assisted suicide cite accounts
such as these as support for the legalization of assistance in death.
Theoretically, the "botched" suicide attempt in the Steven Shiflett
story would not have occurred if his physician could have been legally
present to administer the lethal dosage.92
Although personal accounts provide compelling support for the le-
galization of assisted suicide, many states prohibit aiding and abetting
suicide through either specific statutory provisions, 9 or prosecution
under murder or attempted murder charges.Y Advocates of legalized
assisted suicide must overcome the criminal law history in many states
by establishing that the right to assisted suicide is not only supported
by the public, but also constitutionally valid. The most advantageous
method for altering the current law is to demonstrate a protected con-
stitutional right to medical assistance in death, or alternatively, that
the enactment of a statute establishing a right to assisted suicide will
be upheld as constitutional.
92. For example, Dr. John P. Geyman, a physician-plaintiff in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), described the importance of physician as-
sistance: "Terminally ill persons who seek to hasten death by consuming drugs need medical
counseling ..... Knowing what drug, in what amount, will hasten death for a particular pa-
tient, in light of the patient's medical condition and medication regimen, is a complex medical
task." Id. at 1457 (citing the Declaration of John P. Geyman, M.D., pp. 3-5). Dr. Geyman
explained that patient efforts to hasten death through a drug overdose "are often unsuccessful"
and "[viery often, patients who survive a failed suicide attempt find themselves in worse shape
than before the attempt." Id. See also Hemlock Society Holds Seminar for Those Diagnosed
with AIDS, STAR TIaB. (San Francisco), June 21, 1993, at 7A (reporting on a seminar held by
Derek Humphry that provided information on how to avoid a "botched" suicide attempt in the
absence of physician assistance).
93. Pugliese, supra note 7, at 1295 n.20 (listing all of the states with laws prohibiting as-
sisted suicide), see also Reno, supra note 3, at 1176-83 (1992) (appendix providing the text of
each state law prohibiting assisted suicide).
94. See, e.g., People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding convic-
tion of second degree murder for defendant who assisted AIDS sufferer in strangulation suicide);
Gentry v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming defendant's murder conviction
for suffocating his mother while she was affected by a drug overdose in an attempted suicide);
State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343 (Ohio 1987) (affirming aggravated murder conviction for assisting
in the suicide of a friend). But see In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176 (Cal. 1983) (finding that
minor, who entered a genuine suicide pact, but survived, was guilty only of aiding and abetting
suicide, not murder). For a general discussion of the different state criminal provisions regarding
assistance in suicide through either aiding and abetting or murder charges, see John H. Derrick,
J .D., Annotation, Criminal Liability for Death of Another as Result of Accused's Attempt to
Kill Self or Assist Another's Suicide, 40 A.L.R.4th 702 (1985); and Catherine D. Shaffer, Crimi-
nal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 348 (1986).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR A RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
Advocates of assisted suicide claim that court decisions recognizing
the right to refuse and remove life-sustaining treatment also establish
the basis for the right to medically assisted suicide. The following
analysis of several court decisions provides a constitutional rationale
for the right to assisted suicide, 9 even though the courts have cau-
tiously and explicitly excluded assisted suicide from the scope of their
decisions. This assessment begins with In re Quinlan,9 the landmark
case that recognized the right to refuse medical treatment, followed by
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,9 7 the first assess-
ment by the United States Supreme Court of the issue of the "right to
die." The recent decision in Compassion In Dying v. Washington"
explicitly held that the constitutional basis for a "right to die" also
encompasses a protected liberty interest in the decision to seek assis-
tance in suicide. Thereafter, the extent to which other state courts
have extended the right to refuse life-sustaining care will be discussed
in order to evaluate the constitutional basis for a statutory right to
assisted suicide.
A. In re Quinlan and Cruzan: The Foundation of Patient Autonomy
In the 1976 case, In re Quinlan," the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a life-support system could be removed from a comatose
patient who, based on a consensus of medical opinions, had no rea-
sonable possibility of recovery from a persistent vegetative state.1°°
The Quinlan decision initiated public acceptance of a person's deci-
95. An extensive analysis of the constitutional basis for the right to assisted suicide is be-
yond the scope of this Article. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see James Bopp, Jr., J.D.,
Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 IssuEs iN L. & MED. 113 (1987). James Bopp,
Jr., is the attorney leading the challenge against the Oregon Death With Dignity Act on the
grounds that the Act violates the constitutional right to freedom of religion and due process. Dee
Lane, Attorney Is Veteran ofRight-To-Die Cases, OREGd tiAN, Dec. 11, 1994, at A12.
96. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Chief Justice Rehnquist recog-
nized In re Quinlan as the "seminal decision" on the issue of the "right-to-refuse-treatment" in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,270 (1990).
97. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (Chief Justice Rehnquist stating for the Court that this "is the first
case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the United States Constitu-
tion grants what is in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die').
98. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994). This decision is currently on appeal by the state
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco. Muriel Dobbin, Courts, Voters
Asked to Wrestle with Assisted Suicide Questions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 28, 1994, at A14.
99. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (providing that the decision to discontinue the life-support
system would be made by the attending physicians and Karen's father, followed by a consulta-
tion with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or similar body of the hospital in which Karen was
then hospitalized).
100. Id. at 671-72. The testimony of several medical experts "characterized Karen as being in
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sion to reject life-sustaining treatment, and thus, a right-to-die under
certain circumstances. 0' The court weighed an individual's constitu-
tional right to privacy against the merit of the state's interest in pre-
serving human life and protecting the integrity of the medical
profession.Ie 2 Under this balancing test, the state's interest "weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily in-
vasion increases and the prognosis dims."'0 3 The court concluded that
termination of life support under these circumstances would constitute
neither homicide nor "aiding suicide" because the subsequent death
would occur from "existing natural causes." ' 04 Under the facts pre-
sented, the court held that an incompetent patient's right to privacy
could be asserted by her family on her behalf, due to her debilitated
condition. 05
In comparison, the United States Supreme Court decision in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health'0 recognized the right to
refuse hydration and nutrition for a comatose patient under the lib-
erty component of the Fourteenth Amendment.107 While acknowledg-
ing that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
a 'chronic persistent vegetative state.' as a result of a respiratory arrest and associated anoxia.
Id. at 653-55. Karen Ann Quinlan's father petitioned the court for appointment as her guardian
with the express power to discontinue all extraordinary life-support measures. Id. at 651.
101. Physician Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HAsv. L. REv.
2021, 2022 (1992).
102. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64. This conclusion was based on the implicit guarantee of the
right to privacy as established in several United States Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 663 (cit-
ing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Stanley vi Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)). The court explained that presumably this "right
is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
103. Id. at 664; accord Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass.), cert. denied 112
S.Ct. 1512 (1992) (recognizing the right of a guardian to refuse hydration and nutrition for an
incompetent patient on the basis of the patient's fundamental right to bodily integrity).
104. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 670 n.9. The court recognized that the termination of treatment
would "accelerate Karen's death." Id. at 669. In the assessment of the County Prosecutor and
Attorney General's argument that criminal liability would result, the court explained:
[Tihe exercise of a constitutional right such as we have here found is protected from
criminal prosecution. The constitutional protection extends to third parties whose ac-
tion is necessary to effectuate the exercise of that right where the individuals them-
selves would not be subject to prosecution or the third parties are charged as
accessories to an act which could not be a crime. And, under the circumstances of this
case, these same principles would apply to and negate a valid prosecution for at-
tempted suicide, were there still such a crime in this State.
Id. at 670 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that a proposed and independent offense
of aiding suicide "would not be incriminatory in circumstances similar to those presented in this
case." Id. at 670 n.9.
105. Id. at 664.
106. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
107. Id. at 277. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment," ' the Court cau-
tioned that this right may be governed by procedural safeguards
"where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration" of a
person in a permanent vegetative state.'01 The Court explained that a
situation in which a "surrogate" must make a choice between life and
death justifies a heightened evidentiary burden to demonstrate the in-
competent person's wishes." 0 The Court emphasized the state's inter-
est in preserving life and requiring a clear intent to discontinue such
treatment by noting that "the majority of States in this country have
laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to com-
mit suicide.'
Quinlan and Cruzan recognize the right of both competent and in-
competent persons to refuse or request the removal of life-sustaining
medical treatment. Many advocates of assisted suicide argue that the
Supreme Court's recognition of the constitutional right to refuse food
and water under certain circumstances must similarly include the right
to assisted suicide.' 2 But Quinlan and Cruzan also contain qualifying
comments that position assisted suicide beyond the scope of the con-
stitutional right to die."'
Both decisions emphasize a distinction between assisted suicide and
the right to remove or refuse medical treatment by referring to the
history of state prohibitions against aiding and abetting suicide. Be-
108. 497 US. at 278-79.
109. Id. at 284 (referring to the Missouri Supreme Court's application of a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard for discontinuation of such treatment for an incompetent patient).
Nancy Beth Cruzan suffered severe injuries as a result of an automobile accident and thereafter
existed in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 266. The court defined "persistent vegetative state"
as "a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of signifi-
cant cognitive function." Id. Her parents obtained an order from the state trial court authoriz-
ing the termination of artificial hydration and nutrition after it became apparent that her
condition was irreversible. Id. at 267-68. The trial court found both a state and federal constitu-
tional right to refuse or direct the removal of "death prolonging procedures." Id. at 268. How-
ever, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed due to the lack of clear and convincing evidence of
Nancy's intent to refuse treatment under these circumstances. Id. at 268-69. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 270-78.
110. Id. at 280.
111. Id. (explaining that "[wle do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face
of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death").
112. See, e.g., Pugliese, supra note 7, at 1311 (asserting that assisted suicide "is the next
logical step in granting patients the right of serf-determination"); Lehr, Wrenching Choices, su-
pra note 7, at I (reporting Lawrence 0. Gostin, Executive Director of the American Society of
Law and Ethics, favors legislation intended to legalize physician assisted suicide); and Sidney H.
Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 Naw EKo. J.
MaD. 844, 848 (1989) (commenting that "it is not immoral for a physician to assist in the ra-
tional suicide of a terminally ill person").
113. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 & n.8 (emphasizing the illegality of assisted suicide in the
"majority of States"); Quinlan; 355 A.2d at 670 n.9 (distinguishing "aiding suicide" from the
discontinuation of life-support measures).
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cause state prohibitions against assisted suicide existed at the time of
these decisions, both courts had to explain why a person who actually
removed life-support, thus hastening the death of another person,
would not be subject to criminal liability under the current state
law. 14 The Quinlan court recognized the right to remove unwanted
medical treatment as an aspect of the constitutional right to privacy."'
Participation in the removal of invasive, but life-sustaining treatment
constituted merely an exercise of the patient's right to be free from
unwanted personal intrusion rather than illegal assistance in suicide.
In Cruzan, the Court harmonized the constitutional "right-to-die"
with current state law by focusing on the patient's liberty interest, the
freedom to make a personal decision to remove medical treatment."16
If the decision itself is protected by the Constitution, then the assis-
tance of another person in actually executing the decision to remove
life-sustaining treatment cannot be penalized as aiding and abetting
suicide under the state law. Therefore, the decisions in Quinlan and
Cruzan do not stand for the proposition that assisted suicide is repug-
nant or offensive to the rights expressly provided or judicially con-
strued under the United States Constitution. The decisions merely
exempt the right to discontinue or refuse life-sustaining treatment
from the province of existing state prohibitions against aiding and
abetting suicide and negate any inference that such actions would in-
cur criminal liability under State law.
Although the cases distinguish the right to remove life-sustaining
treatment from assistance in death, they do not expressly rule out the
feasibility of such a right. The decision to terminate or refuse life-
sustaining treatment is a constitutionally protected liberty interest
which may prevail under certain circumstances when balanced against
the state's interest in preserving life. Obviously, the state's interest in
preserving life is paramount in the context of assistance in suicide." 7
But a strong argument can be made that a person's constitutional lib-
erty interest is broad enough to encompass a competent and voluntary
decision to request an expedited death rather than suffer through the
indignity and pain of a protracted natural death from an irreversible
and terminal illness." 8
114. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 & n.8 (referring only to state laws against assistance in
suicide); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 670 n.9 (commenting only on illegality under state penal code).
115. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
116. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-80.
117. The asserted state interests include protection and preservation of life and protecting the
integrity and responsibility of the medical profession. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
118. See Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D Wash. 1994) (recog-
nizing a constitutionally protected right to commit suicide under both the liberty interest compo-
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B. Express Recognition of a Constitutional Right to Assisted Suicide
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, "9 the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Washington invalidated a state
statute20 prohibiting all forms of assisted suicide as both an infringe-
ment of the liberty interest component and a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.' In challenging
the statute, the plaintiffs asserted that mentally competent, terminally
ill adults have a "constitutionally protected right to be free from un-
due governmental intrusion on their decision to hasten death and
avoid prolonged suffering." 2
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution); Michigan v. Kevorkian, 62 U.S.L.W.
2411 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993) (lower court decision recognizing a constitutionally protected
right to commit suicide), rev'd in part, aff'd in part sub nom. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518
N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing lower court's recognition of a constitutional right
to commit suicide while upholding invalidation of statute).
119. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994). This opinion is on appeal by the state to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco. Dobbin, supra note 98, at A14. On December
7, 1994, a three-judge panel of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
initiated a review of the lower court's decision. Patrick O'Neill, Federal Judge Blocks Suicide
Law, OREooNMAtN, December 8, 1994, at Al.
120. The Washington statute banned "aiding or causing the suicide of another: A person is
guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to at-
tempt suicide." Id. at 1458-59 (citing RCW 9A.36.060(l)). The court noted that "[piromoting a
suicide attempt is a class C felony punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five years and
a fine of up to ten thousand dollars." Id. at 1459 (citing RCW 9A.36.060(2) and
9A.20.020(1)(c)).
121. Id. at 1467.
122. Id. at 1459, The plaintiffs in the case consisted of "a coalition of three terminally ill
patients, five physicians who treat terminally ill patients, and Compassion in Dying, an organi-
zation which provides support, counseling and assistance to mentally competent terminally ill
adults considering suicide." Id. at 1456. Due to the numerous plaintiffs in this case, the text will
discuss the patient-plaintiffs' constitutional claims. A brief description here of each plaintiff's
situation is pertinent to the discussion of assisted suicide and provides insight into the context of
the constitutional challenge in this case.
One of the three patient-plaintiffs was Jane Roe, a 69-year-old retired pediatrician and cancer
patient. Id. She was in the terminal phase of her illness, bedridden since June 1993, and experi-
enced constant pain that was not fully alleviated by available medication. Id. The court noted
that she "is mentally competent and wishes to hasten her death by taking prescribed drugs with
the help of plaintiff Compassion in Dying." Id.
Another patient, John Doe, was a 44-year-old artist dying of AIDS. "Since his diagnosis in
1991, he has experienced two bouts of pneumonia, chronic, severe skin and sinus infections,
grand mal seizures and extreme fatigue. He has already lost 70% of his vision to cytomegalovi-
rus retinitis, a degenerative disease which will result in blindness." Id. John Doe was the primary
caregiver for his long-term companion who died of AIDS in June of 1991. The court also noted
that he is "mentally competent, understands there is no cure for AIDS, and wants his physician
to prescribe drugs which he can use to hasten his death." Id. at 1456-57.
The third patient was James Poe, a 69-year-old retired sales representative who suffered from
emphysema. Id. at 1457. He was connected to oxygen at all times, took morphine regularly to
quell the panic associated with his constant sensation of suffocation, and also suffered from
heart failure, resulting in severe leg pain and circulation problems. The court noted that Mr. Poe
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The court assessed the Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion
rights123 and the right to die'2 in concluding that a competent, termi-
nally ill adult has a constitutionally guaranteed right under the Four-
teenth Amendment to physician-assisted suicide. 12 As with individual
decisions regarding abortion and refusal or removal of unwanted
medical treatment, the decision of a terminally ill person to end his or
her life constitutes one of the most "intimate and personal choices a
was "mentally competent and wishes to commit suicide by taking physician-prescribed drugs."
Id.
The physician-plaintiffs included Dr. Harold Glucksberg, assistant professor of medicine at
the University of Washington School of Medicine, who also practiced in the treatment of cancer.
Id. Dr. Glucksberg stated in his declaration that the "cancer patient is fully aware of his or her
present suffering and anticipates certain future suffering." Id. He described the end stages of
cancer as a deterioration of the patient's mental and physical functions and a state of excruciat-
ing, unrelenting pain. Dr. Glucksberg stated that "some patients do not want to end their days
either racked with pain or in a drug-induced stupor." Id.
Dr. John P. Geyman, former professor and chair of the Department of Family Medicine from
1976 through 1990 at the University of Washington School of Medicine, was in private family
practice at the initiation of the case. Id. Dr. Geyman stated in his declaration that a "subset of
dying patients desire to shorten their dying process and thereby avoid a lingering death and
associated pain, suffering and loss of dignity." Id.
The other physicians were Dr. Thomas A. Preston, chief of cardiology at Pacific Medical
Center in Seattle, Dr. Abigail Halperin, family medicine practitioner who occasionally treats
terminally ill patients with cancer or AIDS, and Dr. Peter Shalit, general internal medicine prac-
titioner who treats a substantial number of patients with HIV infection and AIDS. Id. at 1458.
The final plaintiff was an organization called Compassion in Dying, "a Washington non-
profit organization" which provided assistance in death through the use of prescription medica-
tions pursuant to a detailed written protocol and strict eligibility requirements for the individuals
to whom it provides services. Id.
123. 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The court reviewed the analysis in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), and found that the "suffering of a termi-
nally ill person cannot be deemed any less intimate or personal, or any less deserving of protec-
tion from unwarranted governmental intrusion, than that of a pregnant woman." Id. If the
government cannot resolve the philosophical question of abortion "in such a definitive way that
a woman lacks all choice in the matter," then the same liberty concerns must apply to the "pro-
found spiritual and moral questions" surrounding the decision of a mentally competent, termi-
nally ill individual's decision to end his or her life. 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
124. Id. The court assessed Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision for the Court in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), which recognized that a competent
person has a protected liberty in refusing unwanted and life-sustaining treatment. The court then
phrased the issue as whether there is "a difference for the purposes of finding a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest between the refusal of unwanted treatment which will result in death
and committing physician-assisted suicide in the final stage of life." 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
125. It is important to note the context of the patient-plaintiffs' claims. All of the patients
were associated with either the organization, Compassion in Dying, or a physician who was
willing to aid such individuals in an end-of-life decision. Id. at 1456-58. The Washington statute
under challenge would prosecute participating physicians for aiding a terminally ill and compe-
tent adult patient in a request for assistance in death. Id. at 1458-59. Therefore, the decision of
the District Court encompasses only situations where a competent, terminally ill adult makes the
decision to hasten inevitable death with the participation of a willing and supportive physician.
The decision could not be construed to force an unwilling physician to assist such a patient in
assisted suicide.
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person may make in a lifetime.' I26 The liberty interest component of
the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the right to make intensely
private decisions about matters which are "essential to personal au-
tonomy and basic human dignity."'2 7 The court reasoned that there
"is no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which is closer to
the heart of personal liberty, than the choice which a terminally ill
person makes to end his or her suffering and hasten an inevitable
death." 2 In this context, no constitutional distinction can be drawn
"between refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, and physician-as-
sisted suicide by an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally ill
adult.'1 29
Upon finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the deci-
sion to request physician-assisted suicide, the court weighed the
State's interest in maintaining a total prohibition on all assisted sui-
cides against the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent, adult
patients.' 30 In evaluating the State's interest in "deterring suicide by
young people and others with a significant natural life span ahead of
them," the court noted that the plaintiffs are people suffering through
the final stages of a terminal disease which places them beyond the
scope of the State's legitimate interest.'' "As to them, preventing sui-
cide simply means prolonging a dying person's suffering, an aim in
which the State can have no interest."' 3 2 The court surmised that the
State legislature could devise regulations to specifically limit the scope
of permissible physician-assisted suicide to mentally competent, termi-
126. Id. at 1459-61 (analyzing the Supreme Court decisions and reasoning in Casey and Cru-
zan).
127. Id. at 1461.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The court provided an extensive discussion of the appropriate standard of review in a
constitutional challenge to a state statute. The defendants asserted that a facial challenge to the
validity of the Washington statute required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the statute was
invalid under any and all circumstances to succeed in their claim. Id. at 1462 (referring to the
decision in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)). The court, however, followed the
standard set forth in Casey which required the plaintiffs to show that the statute constituted an
"undue burden" on the exercise of their constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted
suicide. Id, at 1462-63 (noting that Casey involved the liberty interest in being free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into fundamental and personal matters as those involved in this
case).
It is pertinent to note that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has several alternative
bases for reversing the District Court's decision. First, the Circuit Court could find that the
liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass a right to physician-as-
sisted suicide. Alternatively, the Circuit Court could recognize such a right, but find that the
District Court failed to apply the correct standard of review for a facial constitutional challenge.
Finally, the Circuit Court could find that neither the liberty component nor the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated by the Washington statutory prohibition on
all types of assisted suicide.
131. Id. at 1464.
132. Id.
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nally ill, adult patients, while maintaining the legitimate State interest
in preventing suicide.13
While regarding the State's interest in protecting people from com-
mitting suicide due to undue influence or duress as a legitimate con-
cern, the court reasoned that terminally ill people who make informed
and voluntary decisions to commit physician-assisted suicide "by defi-
nition fall outside the realm of the State's concern." 134 Beyond this
conclusion, the court emphasized that Washington State law permits a
competent individual to refuse or request the discontinuation of life-
sustaining treatment and recognizes the exercise of such decisions on
behalf of an incompetent patient by a legally authorized representa-
tive. 3' The risk of abuse or undue influence is equally significant in
cases where patients request the removal life-sustaining treatment, and
is even more daunting in situations where a surrogate exercises this
type of decision for an incompetent patient. 3 ' The court concluded
that through the total ban on assisted suicide, the challenged statute
placed an undue burden on a mentally competent, terminally ill ad-
ult's constitutional right to seek physician assisted suicide.' 7
Finally, the court assessed the claim that the statute unconstitution-
ally distinguished between two similarly situated groups of mentally
competent, terminally ill adults in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 8 The plaintiffs asserted that
current state law permitted terminally ill persons sustained on life-sup-
port equipment or artificial nutrition and hydration to legally request
the assistance of a physician in terminating this type of treatment and
thereby hasten death.'3 9 Whereas the law denied patients who suffer
from terminal illnesses, but do not require the application of life-sus-
taining treatment, the option of hastening death with medical assis-
tance.140 The defendants maintained that the state's interest in
133. 850 F. Supp. at 1465. The court referred to the State's interest in prohibiting any type
of assisted suicide as a reaction to the "slippery slope" problem. Id. at 1464. In essence, the
State perceives any exception to a total ban as a threat of gradual acceptance of suicide and the
ultimate increase in suicides by individuals who are temporarily afflicted or distraught rather
than limiting the option to competent and terminally ill adults. Id. at 1464. For further discus-
sion of the arguments against physician-assisted suicide, see notes 188-222 and accompanying
text.
134. Id. at 1465.
135. Id. (referring to Washington's Natural Death Act, Washington Supreme Court deci-
sions, and the acceptance of a durable power of attorney for health care).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. 1454,1466 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
140. Id.
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preventing suicide is only implicated in the context of physician-as-
sisted suicide because death resulting from the removal of life-sustain-
ing treatment is natural and thereby unassisted. 4'
The court concluded that the two groups of competent terminally ill
patients were similarly situated, thus requiring the State to demon-
strate a compelling interest to justify the disparate treatment of the
two groups under Washington law. 4 The court failed to recognize the
distinction between "natural" and "artificial" death as a justification
because both types of "patients may be terminally ill, suffering pain
and loss of dignity and subjected to more extended dying process
without some medical intervention, be it removal of life support sys-
tems or the prescription of medication to be self-administered.' ' 4' In
addition to infringing upon the liberty interests of the patient-plain-
tiffs, the court held that the Washington statute violated the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the
fundamental rights of one group in comparison to the rights of a simi-
larly situated group.'44
Although the Compassion In Dying decision has been appealed, the
district court's reasoning provides a basis for recognizing that a per-
sonal decision to seek assistance in death falls within the province of
the liberty interest component of the Fourteenth Amendment. By fo-
cusing on the nature of the decisions afforded protection under the
Constitution, the district court could not find a distinction between
the decision of a competent, terminally ill adult to request the removal
of life-sustaining treatment or to seek the assistance of a willing physi-
cian to end a protracted death. Both decisions involve a personal
choice to end a prolonged decline into death. To be executed, both
decisions require the voluntary assistance of a health care profes-
sional.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1467.
143. Id.
144. Id. In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist briefly addressed the petitioner's claim that the
state violated the equal protection guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment by treating in-
competent patients differently from competent patients in assessing decisions to discontinue life-
sustaining treatment. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist provided:
The differences between the choice made by a competent person to refuse medical
treatment, and the choice made for an incompetent person by someone else to refuse
medical treatment, are so obviously different that the State is warranted in establish-
ing rigorous procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply to the former
class.
497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12 (1990). In Compassion in Dying, the justification for the class distinction
is less obvious than in Cruzan. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may find a
distinction between the two groups that is sufficient to reverse the District Court's recognition of
an equal protection violation.
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Distinctions may be drawn between the natural occurrence of death
following the removal of life-sustaining treatment and the artificially
induced demise of a patient resulting from physician assisted suicide,
however the precipitating factor in both scenarios is the patient's per-
sonal decision that existence in the end stages of a terminal illness can
no longer be endured. The reasoning in Compassion in Dying and
Cruzan establish a predicate for recognizing that the focus should be
on the mentally competent, terminally ill adult's right to make deci-
sions regarding his or her existence in comparison to the magnitude of
the state's interest in preserving the specific life in question.
C. Implicit Recognition of a Right to Assisted Suicide
Although Compassion In Dying is the only decision explicitly recog-
nizing a constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide, other state
courts have adopted a "quality of life" rationale which implicitly en-
compasses the right to assistance in a controlled death. In Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 45 a California appellate court extended the constitu-
tional right to refuse medical treatment to competent patients who are
not terminally ill, but existing in a life devoid of quality-and possibly
meaning.' 6 The court granted the request of a competent woman, suf-
fering from severe cerebral palsy and quadriplegia, to remove the na-
sogastric tube through which she received nutrition. 4 7 Although
Elizabeth Bouvia was not terminally ill, the court explained that the
additional number of years Bouvia could live under her current medi-
cal treatment must be balanced against the quality of that extended
existence.148 Bouvia remained mentally alert and intelligent.140 Never-
theless, her illness reduced her physical existence to chronic pain, total
immobility, and absolute reliance on the physical acts of others.5 0
The court recognized that competent as well as incompetent patients
may exercise the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment,'
reasoning that "there is no practical or logical reason to limit the exer-
145. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
146. Id. at 304. Because Bouvia was decided before the 1990 Supreme Court decision in
Cruzan, the Bouvia court based its analysis on Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to
privacy under the United States Constitution and the treatment of this issue by courts in several
states.
147. Id. at 307.
148. Id. at 304.
149. Id. at 304-05.
150. Id. at 300. The California appellate court also noted that Ms. Bouvia had expressed the
desire to die on several occasions and once attempted to starve herself to death. Id.
151. Id. at 301 (explaining that the obvious corollary to informed consent is a competent
adult patient's right to refuse medical treatment).
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cise of this right to 'terminal' patients."' 2 In upholding Bouvia's right
to refuse continued tube feedings, the court concluded that the state
interest in preserving life could not possibly justify inflicting "such an
ordeal upon anyone" against their will.5 3 Therefore, it was "immate-
rial that the removal of the nasogastric tube [would] hasten or cause
Bouvia's eventual death.' 15
4
The language and reasoning used by the Bouvia court establishes
the basis for extending the constitutional right to die to patients who
seek assistance in executing a decision to die. Yet the court distin-
guished Bouvia's decision to possibly "accept an earlier death" rather
than rely on tube feedings from the act of suicide, because her situa-
tion did not involve "real parties aiding and abetting" this decision.'
This is a perfunctory distinction at best because it implies that the re-
moval of hydration and nutrition does not implement a physically in-
competent person's decision to die from starvation. 5 6 As in Quinlan
and Cruzan, the true distinction lies in the state prohibition against
assistance in suicide rather than the means by which death occurs."'
The Bouvia court postulated that "a desire to terminate one's life is
probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy."' 58 If an indi-
vidual's right of privacy encompasses a decision to commit suicide,
then the right should also include a complementary decision to seek
assistance in suicide under certain circumstances.
Other judicial decisions recognize that at some point the quality of
a competent adult patient's life is so diminished that the individual
152. Id. at 302 (rejecting the assertion that the right to refuse medical treatment is available
only for terminally ill patients); see also Anne Reigle Crosswaite, Comment, "Do Not Resusci-
tate Order" Allo wed for an Infant with AIDS: In the Interest of C.A., 26 J. OF HEALTH & Hosp.
L. 11 (1993) (discussing an Illinois appellate court decision upholding the prospective authority
of a guardian of an infant with AIDS to consent to a "do not resuscitate order" even though the
infant was not comatose or in a persistent vegetative state).
153. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
154. Id. (noting that the goal of removing the nasogastric tube was "not to hasten death,
though its earlier arrival may be an expected and understood likelihood").
155. Id. at 306 (explaining that Bouvia's motives behind the request for withdrawal of the
tube feedings are irrelevant).
156. The quality of life for Steverr Shiflett, discussed in the preceding section, bears a strik-
ing resemblance to the quality of life Elizabeth Bouvia experienced. Olszewski, supra note 10, at
Al. Shiflett was essentially blind, forced to wear diapers due to his inability to walk to the
bathroom, unable to eat, and reduced to swallowing spoonfuls of olive oil for sustenance. Id.
The only distinction from the facts in Bouvia is that Shiflett was not sustained on life-support
equipment while he suffered from AIDS. Rather than starve to death, Shiflett elected to die
from an overdose of medication while he slept. Id.
157. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306 (assuring that no "criminal or civil liability attaches to
honoring a competent, informed patient's refusal of medical service" in the context of a state
statute prohibiting aid in suicide).
158. Id.
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right to privacy or liberty interest in refusing or removing life-sustain-
ing treatment must prevail over the state's interest in preserving life.
In McKay v. Bergstedt,119 the Supreme Court of Nevada held that
competent adult patients who have either a terminal illness or a lim-
ited life expectancy may exercise their right to refuse or remove medi-
cal treatment without any consideration of the state's interest upon
satisfaction of specific procedural requirements.'6 Although the peti-
tioner died prior to the decision, in order "to provide guidance to oth-
ers who may find themselves in similar predicaments, 1' 61 the court
assessed the merit of a quadriplegic's request seeking the removal of
respiratory support and administration of sedation to lessen any pain
encountered during his demise. 62 The court found that the petitioner
was entitled to the relief sought because his "liberty interest in con-
trolling the extent to which medical measures were used to continue to
sustain his life and forestall his death outweighed the State's interest
in preserving his life." 63
The court distinguished the removal of artificial life support from
the choice to commit suicide, reasoning that the former results in
death from natural causes whereas the latter is achieved through
"some deadly means either self-inflicted or through the agency of an-
other."'" However, the court explained that the person's motives for
seeking removal of life-support are relevant in the balancing of the
individual's liberty interest in self-determination against the state's in-
159. 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990). The court addressed the merit of granting a quadripleg-
ic's request to be removed from a breathing apparatus and to receive sedation to lessen the pain
he encountered during his demise. Id.
160. Id. at 630. The court required written certification by two non-attending physicians that
the patient was competent, suffering from a terminal condition, and free of coercion or pressure
in making his or her decision before the removal or rejection of life-sustaining treatment. Id.
However, the court required that the right of non-terminal patients to refuse or discontinue such
treatment be weighed against the state's interests in a court proceeding. Id. The court established
this procedure in the absence of controlling legislation in the State of Nevada regarding the right
to die. Id. at 629. The procedure outlined in the court's opinion is paralleled in the attempted
legislation in several states for legalized assisted suicide. See infra notes 225-278 and accompany-
ing text.
161. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 629. For a detailed analysis of the ramifications of the Bergstedt
decision, see M. Lisa Wilson-Clayton & Mark A. Clayton, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:
McKay v. Bergstedt, 12 WMTTIrEa L. REV. 439 (1991).
162. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 620.
163. Id. at 625.
164. Id. at 627; accord Thor v. Superior Court 855 P.2d 375, 385 n. 13 (Cal. 1993) (recogniz-
ing the distinction between removal or rejection of medical intervention and the deliberate act of
suicide, with citations to several state courts espousing the same view); Donaldson v. Van de
Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the request by petitioner to have
another person provide a lethal injection to hasten his death in preparation for cryogenic suspen-
sion, on the basis that the right to refuse or remove life-support does not include the right to
consent to murder or assistance in suicide).
ASSISTED SUICIDE
terests in preserving life and preventing suicide. 6 The patient's mo-
tives can be judged by factors such as "severity of physical condition,
diagnosis, prognosis, and quality of life."'66 Therefore, a competent,
terminally ill patient has the right to elect discontinuation of medical
treatment rather than living in a condition of hopelessness, total de-
pendence, and a complete lack of dignity.'
6
'
The Bergstedt court attempted to distinguish suicide from the
choice to discontinue medical treatment which ultimately results in the
death of the patient. Yet the factors assessed by the court apply to
assisted suicide as well, the central issue being the value of the per-
son's existence, based upon his or her own judgment regarding the
quality of life, in relation to the state's interest in preserving that per-
son's life with medical treatment. The right to die is based upon the
patient's subjective assessment of his or her existence in conjunction
with a terminal medical diagnosis. To deny that a person has a right
to seek assistance in ending the same type of dismal existence in the
absence of medical intervention frustrates the principles of self-deter-
mination and individual autonomy. I"
D. Recognizing the Constitutionality of a Statutory Right to
Assisted Suicide
At a minimum, a state could constitutionally recognize a person's
right to control his or her existence through the enactment of a statu-
tory right to assisted death. Upon satisfaction of specific statutory re-
quisites such as confirmation of a terminal medical diagnosis,
incessant suffering, limited life expectancy, and the lack of any mental
165. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 627.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. The personal account of Joseph Leone illustrates this premise. Leone, dying of AIDS,
made this statement to a Boston Globe reporter: "I have the utmost respect for life. Don't get
me wrong .... But when you can't have quality of life, that's when you have to start looking
and start drawing the line." Dick Lehr, Man With AIDS, 38, Exerts His Will and Dies, BosToN
GLoBE, May 12, 1993, at 30. Plagued by numerous illnesses and fighting the end stages of AIDS,
Leone searched for a physician who would agree to "secretly assist him if he chose to commit
suicide." Id. Leone never asked his personal physician because he did not want to implicate his
friend and physician in a crime. However, Leone was able to exercise his constitutional right to
die while on respiratory support following an emergency hospitalization. Id. Leone regained
consciousness and after his initial outrage at being on a ventilator, requested that the tubes and
respiratory support be removed. Thirty minutes later, Leone died. Id. The distinction in this
scenario is that Leone could only control his death legally by virtue of his need for life-sustaining
equipment. It seems illogical, but in the absence of a respiratory arrest, Leone would have had
no right to assistance in exercising a decision about ending his protracted battle with AIDS,
regardless of the diminished quality and associated suffering he would have endured as he waited
for a "nalural" death.
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disorder or depression, the choice of assistance in death under con-
trolled circumstances should be recognized in order to avoid a quality
of death that mirrors the diminished quality of life forming the basis
for such a decision. The decision in Donaldson v. Van de Kamp'69
supports the validity of a statutory right to assistance in death. While
refusing to recognize a constitutional right to "state-assisted death,"
the court in Donaldson noted that the provision of such an option was
within the prerogative of the state legislature. 70
Donaldson petitioned the court for an injunction protecting a friend
from criminal prosecution for ending Donaldson's life through pre-
mortem cryogenic suspension or a lethal injection immediately preced-
ing such a procedure. ' The court recognized that Donaldson could
take his own life "as the exercise of a fundamental right," but refused
to extend the right to provide immunity to third persons who provide
assistance in such a decision.' 7 The court reasoned that the state's in-
terest in maintaining social order through enforcement of the criminal
laws and protecting "the lives of those who wish to live no matter
what their circumstances" outweighed Donaldson's interest in ending
his life through the assistance of a third party in violation of the
state's penal laws.' 73 While sympathetic to the medical situation and
the plaintiff's special needs, the court explained that "it is conceivable
to devise a judicial procedure to supervise Donaldson's assisted
death," but the overriding state interests in such a situation compel a
legislative response rather than a judicial solution.7 4
The criminalization of assistance in suicide operates as a safeguard
against the exertion of emotional distress, family pressure, or blatant
169. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
170. Id. at 64. Under Donaldson, an individual does not have a constitutional right to as-
sisted suicide in the form of actual assistance or the advice and support of a third person. This
ruling directly conflicts with the holding in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp.
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), which recognized the right to physician-assisted suicide for mentally
competent, terminally ill adult patients; see also Margaret B. Reynolds, Esq., Patient's Constitu-
tional Rights Do Not Include the Right to an Assisted Suicide for Cryogenic Suspension,
HEAL THCARE L. NEWSL., Aug. 1992, at 6 (analyzing the ramifications of the Donaldson deci-
sion).
171. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61. Donaldson was suffering from a malignant brain
tumor which would ultimately induce a persistent vegetative state and death. Id. at 60-61. Don-
aldson wanted to end his life through cryogenic suspension in hope of subsequent reanimation
following the development of a curative treatment for his malignant condition. Id. at 61. The
freezing process would result in "irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function
and irreversible cessation of all brain function." Id. Alternatively, Donaldson would end his life
by a lethal dose of medication, for which he sought the assistance of a friend to minimize the
time between his death and the commencement of the cryogenic suspension of his body. Id.
172. Id. at 63.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 64.
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coercion in an individual's decision to end his or her own life.175 If a
state were to enact a statute legalizing assisted suicide with precautions
equivalent to the policies inherent in the existing criminal laws, the
statute should be deemed constitutional based upon the reasoning in
all of the aforementioned cases.
The decision in Hobbins v. Attorney General,76 further supports
the premise that a state could constitutionally enact a statutory right
to assisted suicide. In Hobbins, the Michigan appellate court declared
as unconstitutional a state statute creating a commission on death and
dying and a "new crime of 'criminal assistance to suicide,"" 77 because
the law violated a single subject requirement under the Michigan Con-
stitution. s17 Due to anticipation of supreme court review, the court ad-
dressed the plaintiffs' additional challenge that the criminalization of
assisted suicide infringed upon the exercise of a constitutional right
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 179
As in Compassion In Dying, the court reviewed United States Su-
preme Court decisions to determine whether constitutional protection
could encompass a right to assisted suicide.1s0 Because a right to as-
sisted suicide is not explicitly found in the text of the Constitution, the
court noted that such a right must fall within the category of funda-
mental liberties that are either 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty'" or '''deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition."",1
The court concluded that the right to commit assisted suicide is not a
175. Id. at 63 (explaining that the prohibition against assistance in suicide is based upon the
state interest in protecting "the lives of those who wish to live no matter what their circum-
stances").
176. 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). This case was a consolidation of several ap-
peals: Hobbins v. Attorney G'eneral, 61 U.S.L.W. 2764 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1993) (declaring the
Michigan statute which criminalized assisted suicide unconstitutional as a violation of the single
subject requirement), and People v. Kevorkian, 62 U.S.L.W. 2411 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1993) (recog-
nizing a constitutionally protected right to commit "rational" suicide).
177. Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d at 490. Section one of the Michigan act provided: "The legisla-
ture finds that the voluntary self-termination of human life, with or without assistance, raises
serious ethical and public health questions in the state. To study this problem and to develop
recommendations for legislation, the Michigan commission on death and dying is created." Id.
at 490 (referring to Mici. Comp. LAWS § 752.1021 .28.547(121)) (1993)). Section seven of the act
created the new crime of "criminal assistance to suicide," which established a felony for either
providing the physical means or participating in a physical act which results in another person's
attempt or commission of suicide. Id. (citing to MicH. Comp. LAws § 752.1027(1)(a), (b) (1993)).
The court held that the Michigan statute "has two distinct objects that, although encompassing
the same 'subject,' are not germane to each other, are directed toward different purposes and,
when grouped together in one act, offend the constitutional one-object provision." Id. at 4910.
178. Id. at 492 (referring to Article IV, Section 24 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 492-94.
181. Id. at 492 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)).
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fundamental liberty because neither justice nor liberty would be of-
fended as a result of "this Court's decision not to accord it constitu-
tional status." ' The fact that states have traditionally penalized the
acts of suicide and assisted suicide negates any implication that a right
to these actions "is rooted at all in our nation's history."'9
83
As a final basis for rejecting a constitutional rationale for a right to
assisted suicide, the court asserted that judicial restraint is warranted
in the creation of new constitutional rights and emphasized this con-
tention through the comments of Justice Byron White:
'Realizing that the present construction of the Due Process Clause
represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the
anticipation of the Framers, . . . the Court should be extremely
reluctant to breathe still further substantive content into the Due
Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a State or
city to promote its welfare. "U
Based upon this reasoning, the court declined to find a constitutional
right to commit suicide or assisted suicide. 5
The Michigan appellate court's decision, in particular the quote
from Justice White, underscores the distinction between the role of
the judiciary in construing the Constitution and the role of an individ-
ual state in legislating for the welfare of its citizens. The traditional
history of state prohibition against suicide and later, assisted suicide
evinces the conviction of the state's citizens that such acts should be
illegal. In the event that the consensus of public opinion evolves to
accept assisted suicide under limited circumstances, it would be within
the prerogative of the state legislature, either through a legislative en-
actment or the passage of an initiative measure, to legalize assistance
in death for terminally ill, mentally competent adults who voluntarily
seek such aid from a willing physician. 6
182. 518 N.W.2d at 493.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 494 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland Ohio. 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
185. Id. at 493. For additional debate on the issue of whether the decision of a terminally ill,
competent adult falls within the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Donald E. Shelton in Hobbins. Id. at 494-99 (stating
that "the court does not believe that a distinction can be drawn between refusing life-sustaining
treatment and physician-assisted suicide by an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally ill
adult").
186. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-300 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (asserting that the citizens of a state rather than the federal courts should decide,
through their elective representatives what course the law should take in right-to-die issues);
Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1465-66 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (providing
"[tihe court has no doubt that the legislature can devise regulations which will define the appro-
priate boundaries of physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill individuals").
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If there is no express or implicit right to assisted suicide under the
Constitution, then there is conversely no direct constitutional prohibi-
tion against a state enacting a statutory right to such an option if it
comports with the requisite safeguards and precautions in the prece-
dent "right-to-die" decisions. For example, a statute that requires
clear and convincing evidence of a competent adult patient's intent to
voluntarily seek medically assisted suicide should meet the standard
established in Cruzan for the discontinuation of life-sustaining treat-
ment for incompetent patients. Moreover, a statute with procedural
safeguards such as medical confirmation of a patient's terminal diag-
nosis, limited prognosis and mental competency can ensure the legali-
zation of assisted suicide for only competent terminally ill adults who
make an informed election for assistance in death. Therefore, the
state's interests in preserving life and preventing suicide may be al-
tered to allow medically assisted death as an adjunct to the right to
die.18
7
V. OPPosITIoN TO MEDICALLY ASSISTED SUICIDE: SPECIFIC CONCERNS
FOR PERSONS WITH AIDS
Although the enactment of a statute creating a right to assisted sui-
cide should be deemed constitutional, the actual passage of such an
initiative requires a favorable consensus of the voting public. For each
positive aspect illustrated in personal accounts of assisted suicide,
such as respect for personal autonomy and deliverance from suffer-
ing, there is an opposite concern of equal magnitude. Although the
option of medically assisted suicide garnered voter approval in Ore-
gon, it is prudent to discuss the common arguments raised in opposi-
tion to assisted suicide in order to establish a paradigm of essential
safeguards for legalizing medically assisted suicide in relation to per-
sons with AIDS.
A. General Concerns Regarding AIDS and Assisted Suicide
Opponents of assisted suicide view the participation of a compas-
sionate physician in a patient's suicide as an affirmation that a person
187. Because the outcome of the legal challenge to the Oregon Act is pending, this section of
the Article assesses the constitutionality of an enacted statutory right to medically assisted sui-
cide, such as the Oregon Death With Dignity Act. Because legal challenges have not been initi-
ated regarding the Oregon statute to date, this Article provides an argument for upholding such
a statute without direct references to the Oregon Act. See Lane & Heinz, supra note 6, at BI
(reporting that a constitutional challenge to the Act was filed on December 1, 1994 in the United
States District Court in Eugene, Oregon); Lane, supra note 6, at Al (reporting that the federal
judge granted a preliminary injunction on December 27, 1994, prohibiting the application of the
Death With Dignity Act until the constitutionality of the statute is determined); and Saunders,
supra note 6, at D13 (reporting speculation of a challenge to expand the new law to allow lethal
injections by "a patient who is not physically capable of taking lethal pills").
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with a terminal illness or AIDS does not possess a quality of life suffi-
cient to justify continued existence in our society.'88 Opponents argue
that "[h]uman life has value, even in suffering."'8 9 It is the suffering
which should be alleviated through the provision of emotional, medi-
cal and financial assistance for patients with terminal illnesses rather
than promoting the availability of assistance in suicide.19°
The difficulty with assisted suicide decisions based upon quality-of-
life assessments lies in defining the quantum of decline in "quality"
necessary to justify such an alternative. In many proposals, eligibility
requirements for medically assisted suicide include a terminal diagno-
sis and the likelihood of death within six months. "But prognoses for
survival are never that accurate; about 10 percent of patients admitted
to hospices to die end up being discharged home because of either
remission or inappropriate diagnosis."' 9' HIV infections and AIDS
give rise to even greater uncertainty. For example, should assisted sui-
cide be an option upon receipt of an HIV-positive test result, or when
the first sign of severe immunosuppression occurs, or only after an
AIDS diagnosis? 192
Because HIV ultimately leads to AIDS, the HIV infection alone
could arguably constitute eligibility for medical assistance in suicide.
Yet research indicates that a person may remain HIV-positive for sev-
eral years before exhibiting symptoms of the.infection or receiving an
AIDS diagnosis.19 Receipt of an HIV-positive test result does not sig-
nal an automatic decline in the quality of one's life, nor establish a
compelling basis for assistance in suicide. The diverse progression of
HIV infection precludes a definitive prognosis for most persons with
188. Lehr, Physicians Are Helping, supra note 10, at I (reporting the comment of Arthur
Dyck, an ethics professor at Harvard Divinity School, regarding assisted suicide under any cir-
cumstances: "The message is that life isn't worth it, and that life for people in similar conditions
isn't worth living.").
189. Rita Raysa, Voice of the People-'This is Murder,' Cm. Trm., June 23, 1990, at 9
(publishing a letter of a citizen opposed to assisted suicide legislation).
190. J. Gay-Williams, The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia, in Eune AsiA 97, 101-02 (Robert
M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989) (stating "we have a clear duty to comfort those in
need and to ease their suffering when we can").
191. D. Alan Shewmon, Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora's Box, in Eu-
T"HAsiA 129, 130 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989).
192. 'Dr. Death' is No Angel of Mercy, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 29, 1992, at 33 (edito-
rial warning that there "might be a doctor for whom a positive HIV test might be enough, in
and of itself, to suggest assisted suicide").
193. Update: Acquired Imrfunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MoaBIDIT & MoR-
TArJTY W EKLY REp. No. 35, 17, 29 (Jan. 17, 1986)(reporting that the time from HIV exposure
to AIDS diagnosis may last as long as seven years); see also Kolata, supra note 29, at C I (report-
ing that the span between HIV infection and AIDS diagnosis ranges from two to ten years).
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AIDS.'19 Although vulnerability to opportunistic infections results in
recurrent illnesses and possible hospitalizations, patients in this stage
of HIV infection cannot generally be categorized by a medical prog-
nosis of imminent death. 19
Moreover, a person with a T-cell count of less than 200 cells per
microliter of blood currently falls within the category of reportable
AIDS cases under CDC guidelines, even in the absence of clinical
symptoms associated with the disease.1'9 In essence, an individual can
be HIV-positive and asymptomatic, but fall within the classification
of an AIDS diagnosis solely on the basis of a diminished T-cell
count. 97 If a statute recognized an AIDS diagnosis as the basis for
eligibility for medically assisted suicide, a person who is merely HIV-
positive could qualify for such an option without any physical illness
or change in his or her quality of life. Therefore, the eligibility re-
quirement of any proposal legalizing assisted suicide must minimize
the potential for including individuals on the basis of a medical diag-
nosis who are neither terminal nor suffering from any physical debili-
tation.
1. Fear of Intentional or Inadvertent Coercion
Even if medically assisted suicide was limited only to people in the
final stage of AIDS, opponents argue that this creates a status quo
expectation for people with the disease' 98 The accounts of "Dean,"
Steven Shiflett, and the patient assisted by Dr. Green' 99 would become
194. Although medical studies indicate that the average survival rate following an AIDS di-
agnosis is 18 months, prophylactic therapies such as zidovudine and antibiotic treatments may
forestall the advent of such a diagnosis, and increase the period of resistance to opportunistic
infections and debilitation. Hamilton, supra note 35, at 442.
195. For example, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), a common opportunistic infec-
tion, occurs at some point in at least 85 % of HIV-positive individuals. Schneider, supra note 41,
at 1836. Yet prophylactic treatments with pentamidine and co-trimoxazole reduce the incidence
of PCP infections as well as other opportunistic infections. Id. at 1839-40 (reporting that co-
trimoxazole is effective against hemophilus influenza, streptococcus pneumonia and toxoplas-
mosis). Secondary illnesses associated with severe immunosuppression are treatable and there-
fore, should not be considered sole operative events for the election of medically assisted suicide.
196. CDC, 1993 Revised Classification, supra note 29, at 2 (referring to Table 1, depicting
expanded AIDS surveillance case definition based upon T-cell suppression and AIDS-indicator
conditions); see also Webber, supra note 40, at 10 (explaining that the T-cell count of a healthy
person is in the range of 1000 cells per microliter of blood).
197. CDC, 1993 Revised Classification, supra note 29, at 2 (referring to "Clinical category
A, Asymptomatic, acute (primary) HIV" in Table I).
198. Rutten, supra note 11, at 1. The article reported the comments of Bob, a gay man who
assisted his lover in suicide, and vacillates on the issue of legalizing this practice: "I think of Ian
and all the other people I know with AIDS. If euthanasia is the norm, why not put them all out
of their misery? After all, they're all going to die anyway." Id.
199. See also supra notes 64-98 and accompanying text (describing the personal accounts of
AIDS patients who planned or committed assisted suicide).
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the norm because the availability of assisted suicide could result in a
feeling of obligation for people with AIDS or terminal illnesses to
"choose death to spare their families the emotional and financial bur-
den of their care. ' '20 Subtle coercion based upon expectations or fi-
nancial concerns is difficult to prevent or detect even if the physician
has knowledge of the patient's intimate relationships and family situa-
tion.201
Opponents also fear that physicians will routinely discuss this prac-
tice with their patients, as in the example of Dr. Ben Aidant, who has
offered the option of assisted suicide to his cancer patients for two
decades. 20 2 The mere sympathetic discussion of assisted suicide be-
tween physician and patient may convey the impression that assisted
suicide is not only an option, but also a desirable alternative in the
physician's opinion. 203 By this reasoning, the opportunities for coer-
cion, whether overt or implied, are too pervasive to consider legalizing
such an option.
Additionally, the personal accounts of Dr. Yarnell, "Dean," Steven
Shiflett, and Dr. Green's patient2°4 suggest that these men had access
to reasonable health care, evinced by the references to medication and
treating physicians. In contrast, more than thirty-one million Ameri-
cans lack health insurance. 205 Many individuals cannot afford even
minimal health care.2 These deficiencies in basic medical access only
serve to heighten the likelihood of desperation and suicidal thoughts
200. Orentlicher, supra note 15, at 1845; see also William Reichel & Arthur J. Dyck, Eutha-
nasia: A Contemporary Moral Quandary, LANCET, Dec. 2, 1989, at 1321, 1322 (postulating "[i]f
euthanasia were legalized [sic], individuals themselves might believe that society does not want
them to live").
201. Nancy W. Dickey, M.D., Euthanasia: A Concept Whose Time Has Come?, 8 IssuEs iN
L. & MED. 521, 528 (1993) (describing the possibility of subtle coercion for patients to choose
euthanasia to sustain the current financial security of the family); see also Eugenie Anne Gif-
ford, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1545, 1562-63
(1993) (explaining that patients "may feel that they are undue burdens on their families and so
should remove themselves").
202. Lehr, Physicians Are Helping, supra note 10, at 1 (reporting that the doctor, referred to
as Ben Aidant, "has assembled a team, enlisting nurses who share his perspective to perform the
actual killing of a patient with whom he has a death pact").
203. Orentlicher, supra note 15, at 1845 (asserting that "the hopelessly ill patient will not feel
entirely free to resist a suggestion from the physician that suicide would be appropriate, particu-
larly since it comes from the person whose medical judgment the patient relies on").
204. See supra notes 64-98 and accompanying text (referencing the involvement of physicians
and availability of health care in these personal accounts of assisted suicide).
205. Scheier, supra note 20, at 3; see also Mary Margaret Penrose, Assisted Suicide: A
Tough Pill to Swallow, 20 PPP. L. REV. 689, 715-16 (also arguing that the financial pressures
arising out of the unavailability of medical insurance for many people in this country makes
decisions regarding assisted suicide suspect).
206. Scheier, supra note 20, at 3.
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for an uninsured person diagnosed with AIDS. 0 7 Opponents of as-
sisted suicide contend that until adequate health care is available for
all Americans, the prospect of medically assisted suicide is not only
improper, but also a discriminatory inducement for individuals to
seek assistance in death because of financial inability to obtain treat-
ment for a terminal, or perhaps merely debilitating illness. 08
2. Fear of Eugenics or Involuntary Selection
Opponents fear that a statutory right to choose assisted suicide may
lead to a program of controlled selection for involuntary euthanasia
reminiscent of the Nazi era.2 9 Inherent in any legislation allowing
medically assisted suicide is the power to dictate who will live and who
will die as a result of a physician's diagnosis. Before the Holocaust,
German physicians selected mentally and physically incompetent pa-
tients for euthanasia based on an assessment that their lives were "de-
void of value" and their institutional care was a drain on the national
economy. 10 A valueless existence coupled with the exorbitant treat-
ment costs for AIDS patients provides a foundation for the same type
of political class distinctions which fostered a national policy of invol-
untary euthanasia and eugenics in Nazi Germany.2"' Opponents argue
that minorities or low-income patients with diseases such as AIDS
may be disproportionately counseled by physicians and families to opt
207. Kay Longcope, AIDS-Related Suicide Up: Sometimes Victims, and Those Who Love
Them Only Wish to End the Pain, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1990, at 25 (interviewing Larry
Kessler, member of the Massachusetts AIDS Action Committee, who explained that suicides
tend to increase as services decline and the "numbers climb as more of the sick try to access a
limited system").
208. Penrose, supra note 205, at 715; James Podgers, Matters of Life and Death: Debate
Grows Over Euthanasia, 78 A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (May 1992) (reporting the comment of John Pick-
ering, chair of the ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly: "We must recognize
that as long as there is no universal health insurance, families and health care institutions can
exert a subtle pressure on patients to terminate their lives because of the costs involved in life-
sustaining treatment").
209. Geraldine Baum, Bishops Battle Euthanasia, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 2, 1987, at 4;
see also Reichel & Dyck, supra note 200, at 1322 (comparing legalization of assisted suicide with
foundation for euthanasia movement in Germany before the Holocaust); Penrose, supra note
205, at 703-04 (discussing the analogy between the Nazi program and the current American pro-
posals for assisted suicide).
210. Reichel & Dyck, supra note 200, at 1322; see also Penrose, supra note 205, at 703-04
(describing the Nazi goal of "freeing national resources otherwise squandered on the mental and
physical dependents of the State").
211. Paul K. Longmore, Ph.D., Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3
IssuEs IN L. & MED. 141, 145-46 (1987); see also Reichel & Dyck, supra note 200, at 1322 (assert-
ing that what "begins for the patient's own wishes, may later be endorsed for economic rea-
sons" in relation to cost-containment and autonomy for AIDS patients in assisted suicide
decisions).
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for medically assisted suicide as an alternative to receiving expensive
health care. 1 2 Finally, some opponents fear that the publicized suffer-
ing of people like Steven Shiflett and "Dean" may provide an emo-
tional platform for passing assisted suicide legislation, and establish a
precedent for categorizing elderly, mentally impaired, or disabled in-
dividuals as involuntary candidates for this practice. 213
3. Physicians Should Treat, Not Kill
Opponents of medically assisted suicide regard physician participa-
tion as an abhorrent abuse of the Hippocratic oath, which provides:
"I will neither give deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I
make suggestion to this effect. '21 4 A physician's duty is to preserve
life, not to actively assist in a patient's death. 21 To allow otherwise
would turn a relationship of trust and respect between physician and
patient into one of suspicion and fear if the patient is diagnosed with
AIDS or another terminal illness. 2 6 Additionally, physicians may be-
212. Lehr, Long Hidden Practice, supra note 10, at I (reporting the comment by Dr. Nicho-
las Parkhurst Caballeira, director of the Boston-based Latino Health Institute, to the effect that
medically assisted suicide could easily result in racist decisions due to heightened counseling for
minorities to consider such an option).
213. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, J.D., Sanctioned Assisted Suicide: "Separate But Equal"
Treatment for "New Illegitimates," 3 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 245, 251-55 (1987) (asserting that
seven distinct groups of people "would be the victims of an open discrimination in the name of
mercy" if assisted suicide becomes a legal option); Pugliese, supra note 7, at 1313-14 (explaining
that opponents of "physician-assisted suicide fear that if legislation is passed, it will not be
limited to the sympathetic cases of the terminally ill, but will also be used to encourage the
elderly or disabled to choose death rather than become a burden"); Lewis & Christoff, supra
note 18, at 17A (reporting the comment of Alexander Capron, the Topping Professor of Law,
Medicine and Public Policy at the University of Southern California Law Center, and a re-
nowned medical ethicist, to the effect that legalizing assisted suicide "could culminate in the
killing of frail, old or disabled people who don't consent").
214. Gifford, supra note 201, at 1554 (1993) (citing LUDni EDELSTEIN, The Hippocratic
Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation, in ANciET MED. 6 (1967)); see also Gaylin, supra
note 9, at 2139 (stating that "[w]estern medicine has regarded the killing of patients, even on
request, as a profound violation of the deepest meaning of the medical vocation").
215. See Shewmon, supra note 191, at 137 (arguing that advocates of medically assisted sui-
cide seek to use physicians to provide an air of respectability and credibility to a cause which will
result in irreparable harm to society by transforming the "image of [a] physician from healer to
killer"). The religious aversion to assistance in death and the philosophical arguments are be-
yond the scope of this Article. For a detailed analysis of the religious and ethical arguments
against medically assisted suicide, see To DIE oR NOT To DIE?: CROSS DISCIPLINARY, CULTUIAL
AND LEOAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE DEATH (Arthur S. Berger & Joyce Berger
eds., 1990); and George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted
Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275 (1989).
216. Assisted Suicide Faces Fight in N.H.: Living-Will Backers Say Bill Goes Too Far, BOS-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1991, at 47 (reporting the comment of Warren Emley, physician and presi-
dent of the New Hampshire Medical Society, "[it really makes the doctor the executioner, and
no doctor can truly predict when a patient is going to die"); see also Gaylin, supra note 9, at
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come professional executioners like Dr. Kevorkian, the Michigan phy-
sician who has assisted in the suicides of twenty-one people whom he
did not know prior to the fatal events. 2 7 Rather than assisting a pa-
tient's death, physicians should view suicidal impulses as an indication
for either psychiatric treatment or improved management of the pain
and suffering associated with diseases such as AIDS.
218
Opponents attribute most suicidal intentions to clinical depression
or AIDS dementia 1 9 which require immediate assessment and treat-
ment, rather than affirmation through physician acquiescence in sui-
cide plans. 220 The need for psychological counseling and support is
crucial for persons with AIDS given the "social stigma attached to
AIDS and the specter of an inexorable illness that, before it kills, can
cause pain, disfigurement, dementia, blindness and emaciation.
2 2 1
The heightened possibility of an AIDS patient requesting assistance in
death due to a temporary period of depression or AIDS dementia
should compel physicians to recommend counseling and psychological
2140 (arguing that "if physicians become killers or are even merely licensed to kill, the profes-
sion-and, therewith, each physician-will never again be worthy of trust and respect as healer
and comforter and protector of life in all its frailty"); Podgers, supra note 208, at 62 (reporting
the comment of James Bopp, a lawyer active in the right-to-life movement, on the issue of physi-
cians directly assisting in a patient's death: "This would destroy the special role of the physi-
cian. . . .If a physician's role is to take your life [as well as preserve it], that injects a lot of
ambiguity into the relationship").
217. Penrose, supra note 205, at 716-17; see also Zima, supra note 23, at 401 (stating that
one of Dr. Kevorkian's patients, Janet Adkins, answered an advertisement Kevorkian placed in a
magazine to find a volunteer to test his suicide machine); 'Dr. Death' Is No Angel of Mercy,
NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 29, 1992, at 33 (arguing that medically assisted suicide "would give
the imprimatur of societal approval not only to the kind and sensitive physician, but to those
who are unscrupulous and may have twisted motives as well"); and Kevorkian Helps, supra note
10, at A3 (reporting that Kevorkian assisted in a twenty-first suicide on November 26, 1994).
218. Dickey, supra note 201, at 525; Glass, supra note 53, at 1370 (advocating that physi-
cians should consider suicide in "AIDS patients as in others, as an untoward illness outcome to
be diagnosed, treated, and prevented"); Longcope, supra note 207, at 25 (interviewing Robin
Miller of the Boston Visiting Nurse Association's AIDS program, who "deals daily with AIDS
patients, for whom, throughout the disease, 'the thought of killing themselves comes up off and
on"').
219. Parry, supra note 43, at 82 (stating that "50 to 70 percent [of persons with AIDS] will
develop an organic mental disorder sometime during the course of their illness," all of which are
included in the term AIDS dementia complex).
220. See Glass, supra note 53, at 1370 (advocating the importance of "social support sys-
tems" and vigorous treatment for psychiatric complications from AIDS, particularly "depres-
sion, delirium or dementia"); Podgers, supra note 208, at 62 (quoting a 1991 report on
"Decisions Near the End of Life" by the AMA's Council on Judicial Affafrs, which provided:
"There is evidence to suggest that most requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide would be
eliminated if patients were guaranteed that their pain and suffering will be eased and their dig-
nity and self-sufficiency promoted"); Zima, supra note 23, at 403 (proposing that "[tireating the
underlying pain, depression, or delirium may eliminate the patient's wish to die").
221. Garcia & Zonana, supra note 91, at B I (reporting on several counseling programs avail-
able to AIDS patients in the Los Angeles area and the high incidence of suicides in this group).
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assessment rather than validate suicidal inclinations. Opponents essen-
tially argue that a "rational patient simply does not and cannot
choose euthanasia. m
B. A Paradigm for Medically Assisted Suicide: Protection for
Persons with AIDS
From this brief discussion of the most common arguments against
medically assisted suicide, three dominant areas of concern emerge: 1)
eligibility; 2) physician involvement; and 3) potential for coercion, in-
voluntary euthanasia, and incompetency of the requesting person due
to mental disorders or depression. In order to legalize medically as-
sisted suicide through either a legislative enactment or an initiative
measure, a proposal must satisfactorily address each of these areas of
concern for the public. Initially, a proposal must establish stringent
prerequisites that limit the option of medically assisted suicide to only
those individuals who suffer from a protracted and terminal condi-
tion.223 Eligibility is particularly important in the context of AIDS be-
cause of the versatility of HIV infection and the broad scope for
AIDS classification under current CDC guidelines.
The degree of physician involvement encompasses both the prelimi-
nary medical diagnostic procedure and the type of participation pro-
vided under such a statute. Recognizing that the argument against
physicians killing patients is formidable, a proposal must at a mini-
mum provide a detailed process for an "informed consent" type of
discourse between the physician and the requesting patient, and a re-
porting requirement for all assisted deaths. nA proposal must also
establish methods for disqualification on the basis of coercion, psy-
chological impairment, or depression to limit medical assistance in
death to competent patients who voluntarily seek this option. Finally,
a proposal should specifically define the extent of direct physician
participation in the patient's death.
222. Smith, supra note 215, at 337 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Kuhse, supra note 4, at
147 (presenting the argument that a patient "cannot rationally and autonomously choose eutha-
nasia").
223. Quill, supra note 7, at 1381 (advoCating that a patient requesting physician-assisted sui-
cide "must have a condition that is incurable and associated with severe, unrelenting suffer-
ing").
224. Cooke, supra note 25, at 50 (reporting that criteria in the Netherlands for active volun-
tary euthanasia includes examination of all other options prior to the implementation of this
option); Quill, supra note 7, at 1381 (explaining that the "patient must understand the condi-
tion, prognosis, and the types of comfort care available as alternatives").
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VI. ATTEMPTS TO LEGISLATE A RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
Using the summarized paradigm of concerns as a standard, this sec-
tion will analyze the recent proposals presented in Washington, Cali-
fornia and Maine in chronological order, to assess the improvements
in later proposals based upon the previous experiences in other states.
With safeguards closely paralleling the court requirements in "right-
to-die" cases, these proposals failed to be enacted for differing rea-
sons. Thereafter, this section evaluates the successful enactment of the
"Oregon Death With Dignity Act" and the reasons for voter approval
in comparison to the previous proposals in other states. A survey of
the provisions common to both the Oregon Act and the unsuccessful
proposals, and a discussion of their inherent deficiencies, provides a
foundation for the drafting of a model act for medically assisted sui-
cide with an emphasis on additional protections specific to persons
with AIDS.
A. 1991: Washington's "Death With Dignity Act"
The Washington Initiative Measure 119, the "Death With Dignity
Act," entitled mentally competent adults to "aid-in-dying" if they
had a certified terminal or irreversible condition and executed a volun-
tary written directive requesting such aid.2 5 The Act limited eligibility
to conscious, competent, adult patients with a "terminal condition,"
defined as an incurable or irreversible condition that would result in
death within six months. 26 Two physicians, the patient's primary or
attending physician and an additional physician, had to certify in writ-
ing that the patient had a terminal condition.12 Physicians would per-
sonally provide aid in dying to competent qualified adults "in a
dignified, painless and humane manner" upon the voluntary request
of the patient through a written directive. 2 8 A patient in a terminal
condition could execute at any time, a directive requesting aid in dy-
ing. The Act provided a sample directive form which required attesta-
225. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010-.900 (1991), reprinted in OF-
FICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF WASHINGTON, VOTERS PAMPHLET, Initiative Measure 119 27
(1991) (referring to section 1). For ease of reference, the provisions of Initiative Measure 119 will
be cited to both the amended portions of the Washington statute and the corresponding page in
the WASHINGTON VOTER'S PAMPHLET.
226. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70:122.020(7) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S
PAMPHLET, at 27-28.
227. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.020(6)(7) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S
PAMPHLET, at 27-28.
228. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.020(9) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S
PAMPHLET, at 28.
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tion by two disinterested witnesses that they believed the declarer "to
be of sound mind." ' 9
The Act contained several precautions, including the right to revoke
a directive at any time without regard to the patient's "mental state or
competency" through physical, written or verbal actions. 20 Also,
prior to the provision of aid in dying, the attending physician had to
"make a reasonable effort" to determine that the directive met the
procedural requirements of the Act, and if the patient was mentally
competent, that the directive was executed in accord with the current
desires of the requesting patient. 211 Participation in assisted suicide by
a physician or health facility was completely voluntary, but the Act
required a refusing party to make a good faith effort to transfer a
qualified patient to an accommodating physician or facility. 2 2 Death
resulting from the provision of aid in dying would not constitute sui-
cide nor any criminal act. 23  The Act also imposed a penalty for the
alteration or concealment of another person's directive.234
On November 5, 1991, the people of Washington rejected Initiative
119 with 54%/c of the votes in opposition and, remarkably, 46% in
favor, constituting a difference of less than 100,000 votes. 235 Com-
mentators pointed to the lack of adequate safeguards as the primary
reason for public rejection of the initiative. 2 6 Although requiring the
written certification of two physicians that the patient's condition was
terminal, the Act lacked a provision for psychiatric evaluation prior to
the execution of a directive,237 thus entitling persons with AIDS to
229. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030(1) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S
PAMPHLET, at 28.
230. Id.
231. Proposed amendment to WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.060(1) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S
PAMPHLET, at 29.
232. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.060(2) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S
PAMPHLET, at 29.
233. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.070 (1991); WASH. VOTER'S PAM-
PHLET, at 29. Physicians and health care facilities would be immune from any liability for aid in
dying if the requirements of the Act were followed in good faith. Proposed amendment to
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.050 (1991); WASH. VOTER'S PAMPHLET, at 29. The Act also provided
that no "policy of life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner" by the
provision of aid in dying to an insured patient. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.122.070(2) (1991); WASH. VOTER'S PAMPHLET, at 29.
234. Proposed amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.090 (1991); WASH. VOTER'S PAM-
PHLET, at 29-30.
235. Janny Scott, Suicide Aid Focus Turns to California, L.A. Tims, Nov. 7, 1991, at A3.
236. Penrose, supra note 205, at 710 (explaining that Derek Humphry, President and Foun-
der of the Hemlock Society, considered the lack of sufficient protections against abuse as the
basis for the public's rejection of the initiative).
237. WASH. VOTERS PAMPHLET, at 13 (explaining in Statement against Initiative Measure 119
that the Act has "No safeguards for depressed persons who in a moment of despair ask for a
lethal injection... No safeguards to stop someone from ending their life only because they have
no money for health care").
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qualify upon physician certification for aid in dying without any pre-
cautionary evaluation for AIDS dementia or depression. The Act pro-
vided the right to assistance in death, but failed to clearly define the
procedure for implementing aid in dying and the actual participation
by the attending physician.215 In summary, the language of the Act
was too vague and poorly drafted to provide sufficient protection
against the potential for abuse in medically assisted suicide.23 9 How-
ever, Initiative 119 quantified the level of public support for assistance
in dying and also provided the impetus for similar legislation in Cali-
fornia shortly thereafter.
B. 1992: California's "Death With Dignity Act"
Ironically, on November 5, 1992, the voters in California rejected
the "Death With Dignity Act" 2  with 5401o of the votes in opposition
and 46Vo in favor, the same margin which defeated the Washington
Initiative. 241 Using the same definitions as in the Washington pro-
posal, Proposition 161 granted mentally competent adults with a certi-
fied terminal condition the right to voluntary "aid-in-dying" upon
execution of a written directive. 42 Two physicians were required to
certify that the requesting patient had a terminal condition.2 4 3 A direc-
tive could be revoked at any time. 2"
Although similar to the Washington proposal, the California Act
specifically defined the degree of physician participation and provided
238. Id. (claiming that "1-119 protects the doctor who takes your life, but has no safeguards
for you").
239. Wash. Voters Reject Proposal to Legalize Euthanasia, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 7,
1991, at A21 (reporting on the comments of ethicists around the country which criticized the
measure as "poorly written" and lacking adequate safeguards). Another reason for the failure
of Initiative 119 was the provision for the active participation by physicians in a patient's death:
"a patient's right to die doesn't give physicians a right to kill." Giannelli, supra note 17, at 9
(quoting former California Med. Ass'n President Laurens P. White, M.D.).
240. Proposed CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2525-2525.24 (1992), reprinted in OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF
STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, Proposition 161 68 (1992). For ease of reference, the
provisions of Proposition 161 will be cited to both the proposed portions of the California stat-
ure and the corresponding page in the CALIFORNIA VOTER'S PAMPHLET.
241. Steven Green, Right-To-Die Proposition Is Defeated, SACRAMENTO BE, Nov. 4, 1992,
at A5.
242. Proposed CAL. CiV. CODE § 2525.2(h) (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMP-LET, at 68.
243. Proposed CAL. CIV. CODE § 2525.2(j) (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 68. "Terminal
condition" was defined as an "incurable or irreversible condition which will, in the opinion of
two certifying physicians exercising reasonable medical judgment, result in death within six
months or less." Id.
244. Proposed CAL. Civ. CODE § 2525.5 (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 68. The Act
required that a directive requesting aid in dying be witnessed by two disinterested parties and
executed by a mentally competent adult. Proposed CAL. Crv. CODE § 2525.3 (1992); CAL. BALLOT
PAMPHLET, at 68.
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additional safeguards. Aid in dying would occur by the physician ei-
ther administering a medical procedure at the patient's direction, or
providing the means for such a procedure to the patient for self-ad-
ministration. 245 This provision would provide assistance in death to
patients unable to digest oral medications through the option of physi-
cian administration. 246 An attending physician could execute a valid
directive only at the patient's determination that the time for physi-
cian aid in dying had arrived, and following at least two previous re-
quests for such assistance.2 7 Attending physicians could request a
psychiatric or psychological consultation if any concern arose regard-
ing the competency of the patient, but only with the patient's con-
sent.24
Additionally, the Act deemed a directive inoperative if the "declar-
ant" was a patient in a skilled, intermediate or community care facil-
ity at the time of execution, unless witnessed by a Patient Advocate or
special Ombudsmen on aging. 249 This provision required special assur-
ance that patients receiving custodial care made such a decision will-
ingly and voluntarily. Finally, the California Act had a record-keeping
requirement and mandated annual reporting to the State Department
of Health Services, of the requesting patients' age, type of illness, and
date the directive was executed. 2 0
As with Washington Initiative 119, critics of the California Act con-
tended that it lacked sufficient safeguards to protect against abuses.
For example, critics argued that the term "attending physicians" was
too broad because it could authorize all physicians, regardless of their
specialty or expertise, to assist a patient in dying.2 1 They also pointed
245. Proposed CAL. Crv. CODE § 2525.2(k) (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPH.ET, at 68.
246. See, e.g., supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (describing the "botched" suicide
attempt of Steven Shiflett due in part to his weakened digestive system).
247. Proposed CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2525.7, 2525.2(i)(1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 68.
Under the Act, execution of a directive required an "enduring request" by the patient for physi-
cian aid in dying rather than a single request at the time the directive was executed. Id.
248. Proposed CAL. Civ. CODE § 2525.13 (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMLm.ET, at 69.
249. Proposed CAL. CIV. CODE § 2525.4 (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 68. Private hos-
pitals and health care professionals would be under no compulsion to administer aid in dying.
Proposed CAL. CiV. CODE § 2525.8 (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 68-69.
250. Proposed CAL. CIv. CODE § 2525.21 (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 69. The Act
provided for the continuance and payment of life insurance after the execution of a directive,
and penalized coercion, pressure, or fraudulent inducement of another to create a directive as a
misdemeanor, and if death resulted, as a felony. Proposed CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2525.17-2525.18
(1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 69.
251. Colen, supra note 9, at 23 (reporting the comment of Dr. Gale Katterhagen, a Southern
California cancer specialist, who stated "the way the law is written an osteopathic allergist could
set up a death mill out here. I've got nothing against osteopathic allergists, as long as they
practice allergy"); see also CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 35 (claiming in Argument Against Propo-
sition 161 that "Proposition 161 does not require that either the 'attending physician' or the
second opinion be made by a specialist capable of making a terminal diagnosis").
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out that the Act failed to require patient name reporting in the annual
records for deaths from aid in dying. Critics perceived this lack of
patient identification as an avenue for potential abuse because of the
absence of a direct review procedure in the reporting system. 252 Al-
though Proposition 161 provided for psychiatric and psychological
consultations, the patient seeking the execution of a directive had the
right to refuse such an evaluation even if clinically indicated.5 3 This
amounted to a critical deficiency in qualifying the competency of re-
questing patients with AIDS. Even though California Proposition 161
evidenced an improved attempt in drafting assisted suicide legislation,
the failure to provide sufficient safeguards again outweighed the im-
petus for legalizing assistance in dying.
C. 1993: Maine's "Act Concerning the Terminally Ill"
In May of 1993, Senator Pamela Cahill introduced "An Act Con-
cerning the Terminally Ill" providing competent adults, suffering
from a terminal condition, the right to obtain medical assistance in
death. 5 4 A review of the Act demonstrates that Senator Cahill heeded
the criticisms raised in opposition to the Washington and California
proposals through several improvements in the procedures and safe-
guards for medically assisted suicide. Nevertheless, the Act was re-
jected by the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee on January 24, 1994
and defeated shortly thereafter in the Maine House of Representa-
252. Diane M. Giannelli, California Initiative Would Legalize Doctor-Assisted Euthanasia,
Am. MED. NEWs, Nov. 2, 1992, at 1. Opponents also criticized the lack of any requirement to
notify the family of a person who requests to end his or her life. CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at 35
(Argument Against Proposition 161).
253. Paul Jacobs, Proposition 161: Outcome of Death Measure May Rest on lth Hour
Ads, L.A. Timsss, Oct. 28, 1992, at 3. Opponents also criticized the lack of a waiting period
before the execution of a directive and the failure to identify the means by which aid in dying
would occur. Id.
254. Legislative Document 1420, 116th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 1993) (presented as S.P. 453 by
Senator Cahill, Sagadahoc) (to be codified throughout ME. REY. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701-
5-715 (West 1993)). Citations to the Maine Act will reference both the sections to be amended
and the corresponding page of Legislative Document 1420. This was the second bill offered by
Senator Cahill on the issue of medically assisted death. A similar proposal was introduced in
January 1992 which was subsequently defeated in the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee on
March 2, 1992. 1991 ME S.P. 885 (SN) (available in WESTLAW, Bills-Old Library, State Net
Summary). The 1992 Act allowed "a person diagnosed with a terminal condition that is likely to
lead to death and whose condition has been certified by 2 consulting physicians to request a
medically assisted death" under the Maine Living Will Statute. Id. After the failure of the 1992
proposal, Senator Cahill attempted to redraft the bill to provide additional safeguards raised
during the consideration of Senate Paper 885. However, the new proposal was similarly defeated
in the Maine legislature. Telephone Interview with Susan Pinette, Clerk, Maine Senate Judiciary
Committee (Mar. 23, 1994). 1991 ME S.P. 885 (SN) (available in WESTLAW, Bills-Old Library,
State Net Summary).
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tives, even though it contained strict and specific criteria for allowing
assistance in death.2 5
As in the proposals already discussed, the Act recognized eligibility
for medically assisted suicide where a declaration was executed by a
competent adult, in the presence of two disinterested witnesses, and
then presented to the declarant's attending physician. 256 However, the
Act contained several distinctions in the evaluation process that merit
discussion. First, the Act expressly required the attending physician to
assess both the patient's competency to request medically assisted
death and the existence of a terminal condition.2 . 7 Two consulting
255. Telephone Interview with Susan Pinette, Clerk, Maine Senate Judiciary Committee
(Mar. 23, 1994). Testimony presented before the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee included
strident arguments in opposition to the proposal and riveting personal accounts raised in favor
of the Act. For example, Paul Christian, Program Director for the Office of Social Justice &
Peace for Catholic Charities, asserted that the bill was "bad medicine ... bad morality ... bad
economics .. . [and] bad public policy." Paul Christian, Testimony Against L.D. 1420, pre-
sented before the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 11, 1994) (copy of letter on file with
author and available in Office of the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee). Christine Gianopou-
los, Director of the Bureau of Elder and Adult Services, questioned "if a referendum on this
subject will result in undue attention to an issue which is not at this time a public policy priority,
given all the other pressing problem [sic) facing the State." Christine Gianopoulos, Testimony
presented before the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 11, 1994) (copy of letter on file
with author and available in Office of the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee).
Testifying in favor of the Act, Louise Hansen described her first reaction upon hearing that
she had terminal cancer and only a few months to live:
"I was first and foremost determined to locate an exit pill. I knew there would be no
one to help me if I were to spiral down into the clutches of a long and protracted
painful death process. I wanted to avoid the humility, the expense, and the total loss
of any control over stopping such an unnecessary horror."
Louise Hansen, Testimony before the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 11, 1994) (copy
of letter on file with author and available in the Office of the Maine Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee). Finally, Diane Grover described her father's slow and painful death: "My father opted to
suffer because he didn't know if his insurance company would pay his beneficiary should he
decide to take his life, and he was very concerned that my mother should be cared for the rest of
her life which his insurance would guarantee." Darlene Grover, Testimony before the Maine
Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 1I, 1994) (copy of letter on file with author and available in
the Office of the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee).
256. Proposed amendment to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-702-A (a) (West 1993);
L.D. 1420, at 1.
257. Proposed amendment to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-715 (West 1993); L.D.
1420, at 5. "Terminal condition" was defined as "an incurable and irreversible condition that,
without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending phy-
sician, result in death within a relatively short time." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701
(b)(9) (West 1989). The existing Uniform Rights Of The Terminally Ill Act employed the term
"terminal condition" rather than "terminal illness" for specific reasons:
Terminal illness, as generally understood, is both broader and narrower than terminal
condition. Terminal illness connotes a disease process that will lead to death; "termi-
nal condition" is not limited to disease. Terminal illness also connotes an inevitable
process leading to death, but does not contain limitations as to the time period prior
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physicians had to corroborate both the patient's competency and ter-
minal condition. 21 Medically assisted death would only occur upon a
unanimous diagnosis by all three physicians.5 9 Perhaps this height-
ened eligibility requirement countered the fear of coercion or involun-
tary selection for assistance in death. Most notably, the Act contained
a provision allowing the attending physician, consulting physicians or
a "health care facility," which included a "hospital, nursing home,
home health agency, or hospice," to assist in a patient's death upon
compliance with the certification process.2 ° This would allow a termi-
nally ill person to die at home in a familiar setting rather than at a
health care facility.
Although the review process was clearly and succinctly explained in
comparison to the Washington and California proposals, the Act con-
tained several critical deficiencies. The Act vaguely defined medically
assisted death as a "medical service that will end the life of a pa-
tient. "261 This definition did not address the means by which such an
option would occur. Moreover, the Act ambiguously described physi-
cian participation as "assistance" to ensure that the "individual's
death is dignified, painless and humane. "6 The Act did not include a
provision for psychological or psychiatric evaluation, nor a reporting
requirement for physicians and health care facilities that carried out
patient declarations. As in the Washington and California proposals,
the Act used the general term "attending physician," suggesting that
to death, or potential for nonreversibility, as does "terminal condition."
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701 Historical Notes (West Supp. 1993). The use of "reia-
tively short time" was employed to "avoid both the unduly constricting meaning of 'imminent'
and the artificiality of another alternative-fixed time periods, such as six months, one year, or
the like." Id.
258. Proposed amendment to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-715 (West 1993); L.D.
1420, at 5.
259. Id. Washington Proposition 119 required two certifying physicians for a valid directive,
one of whom would be the attending physician. Proposed amendment to WAsH, REV. CODE §
70.122.020(6) (1991); WAsH. VOTER'S PAMPHLET, at 27. California Proposition 161 used the
same language by requiring certification by only "two physicians" that the person is afflicted
with a terminal illness. Proposed CAL. Civ. CODE § 2525.1(h) (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, at
68.
260. Proposed amendment to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701 (2-A) (West 1993);
L.D. 1420, at 1.
261. Proposed amendment to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701 (b)(4-A) (West 1993);
L.D. 1420, at 1.
262. Proposed amendment to Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-715 (West 1993); L.D.
1420, at 6. Many physicians in the State of Maine opposed medically assisted death because
"killing as a medical option in the care of cancer patients" is totally incompatible with the role
of physicians. Letter from Ronald J. Carroll, M.D. et al., to the Chairperson of the Judiciary
Committee, Maine State Legislature (Jan. 10, 1993) (copy on file with author and available in
the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee). The vague definition of physician "assistance" and the
lack of any reporting requirement in the Act added to the general apprehension about physicians
killing their patients.
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any physician would be qualified to provide medical assistance in
death, regardless of his or her practice or level of expertise. While the
Act defined a stringent and distinct qualification procedure, the actual
process for providing assistance in dying was exceptionally unclear.
D. 1994: Enactment of Oregon's "Death With Dignity Act"
In an unprecedented election outcome on November 8, 1994, the
citizens of Oregon voted in favor of the "Oregon Death With Dignity
Act," '263 legalizing physician assisted suicide under limited circum-
stances.2 64 As in the previous proposals, a capable adult patient, suf-
fering from a confirmed terminal disease is eligible to execute a
written request for medication to end "his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner." 2 65 As in the California proposal, an individual spe-
cifically qualified by the State Department of Human Resources must
witness a request executed in a long term care facility. 26 Under the
Act, only Oregon residents may qualify for medically assisted death.267
In contrast to the proposals in other states, the Oregon Act exten-
sively delineates physician participation and the process for patient
qualification. Upon receipt of a valid request, the attending physician
263. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Ballot Measure 16, was passed by a majority of
the voters and was scheduled to take effect on December 8, 1994 upon certification of the elec-
tion results by the Oregon Secretary of State. Telephone Interview with Debbie Hembree, Clerk,
Elections Division, State of Oregon, Office of the Secretary of State (Nov. 15, 1994). However,
a federal judge granted a temporary restraining order on December 7, 1994, in a suit challenging
the constitutionality of the Act. Heinz, supra note 6, at Al. Thereafter, the federal judge issued
a preliminary injunction on December 27, 1994, which postpones the effective date pending the
final determination of the constitutionality of the Act. Lane, supra note 6, at At. For ease of
reference, this Article refers to the provisions of the proposed Oregon Death With Dignity Act as
printed in the Oregon initiative measure. TE OREGON DEATH Wrrs DiGNrrn ACT, Initiative
Measure (Dec. 14, 1993) [hereinafter OREGON PROPOSED ACT] (filed with the Secretary of State
by Peter Goodwin, Barbara Coombs, and Elven 0. Sinnard for the 1994 general election).
264. The Act required exemption for participating physicians from state prosecution for aid-
ing a suicide. This was the basis for a challenge of the Oregon initiative in Kane v. Attorney
General, 871 P.2d 993 (Or. 1994). The petitioners challenged the initiative summary because it
failed to alert voters of a major change in the criminal law of Oregon. Id. at 998. The proposed
initiative "would exempt physicians who comply with the provisions of the proposed measure
from prosecution" under statutes prohibiting aiding a suicide-'"a privilege not enjoyed by other
Oregonians." Id. Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court required an alteration in the ballot sum-
mary explaining the exemption from criminal liability for participating physicians. Id. at 998-99.
265. OREOON PROPOSED ACT, supra note 263 at § 2.01. Under the initiative, "terminal dis-
ease" means "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six (6) months." Id. at § 1.01(12). A
valid request for medication must be written and witnessed by two people, one of whom must be
a disinterested party. Id. at §§ 2.02(1), 2.02(2).
266. Id. at § 2.02(4); cf. Proposed CAL. Crv. CODE § 2525.4 (1992); CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET,
at 68 (providing a heightened attestation requirement to ensure a voluntary and uncoerced re-
quest by a patient in a long-term care facility).
267. OREGON PROPOSED ACT, supra note 263, at § 3.10.
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has the duty to determine that the person is capable,2 6 making a vol-
untary request, and suffering from a terminal disease. 26 Additionally,
the attending physician must inform the patient of his or her medical
diagnosis and prognosis, the risks associated with the prescribed medi-
cation, and the feasible alternatives, such as comfort care, hospice
care and pain control.270 The Oregon Act requires confirmation of the
patient's competency and medical diagnosis by only one consulting
physician, a lower confirmation standard than the Maine proposal.2"'
However, the Act requires mandatory counseling if either physician
believes that the patient is suffering from a condition which may im-
pair his or her judgment."2 The Act limits physician involvement to
prescribing medication for self-administration by the patient, through
an explicit prohibition against death by lethal injection or active eu-
thanasia. 2" Finally, the attending physician must ask the patient to
notify next of kin of the request for medication, but failure to notify
cannot result in a denial of the request. 274
The requirements for counseling and informed consent are only two
of the fourteen safeguards included in the Oregon Act to ensure a vol-
untary and informed request for medication to end one's life.27 The
Act requires an enduring request by the qualified patient, and imposes
a waiting period followed by a mandatory inquiry by the attending
physician to ensure that the patient understands the right to rescind
the request prior to receiving the prescription.2 76 These precautions
also serve to protect persons with terminal illnesses, through unequiv-
ocal verification that their decisions to seek medical assistance in dy-
ing are both voluntary and informed. The Act requires documentation
in the patient's medical record of all duties performed by the attend-
268. The Act defines "capable" as possessing "the ability to make and communicate health
care decisions to health care providers, including communication through persons familiar with
the patients manner of communicating if those persons are available." Id. § 3.01(1).
269. Id. § 3.01(1).
270. Id. § 3.01(2).
271. Id. § 3.01(1); cf. Proposed amendment to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-715
(1993); LD. 1420, at 5 (requiring unanimous certification by the attending physician and two
consulting physicians that the patient meets the eligibility criteria).
272. Oregon Proposed Act, supra note 263, § 3.03 (providing that either physician "shall"
refer the patient to counseling if a mental disorder or depression is suspected).
273. Id. § 3.14 (also providing that actions "taken in accordance with this Act shall not, for
any purpose constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law").
274. Id. § 3.01(5).
275. Id. §§ 3.01-3.14 (including provisions for attending physician responsibilities, consult-
ing physician confirmation, counseling, informed decision, family notification, enduring re-
quest, right to rescind, imposed waiting period, documentation and reporting, residency, and
construction of the Act in relation to other state statutes).
276. Id. § 3.06.
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ing physician ,27 and requires the State Health Division to collect in-
formation and conduct record reviews. 2 8
The most striking differences in the Oregon Act are the residency
requirement and the extensive precautionary aspects of the process for
requesting assistance in dying. For many voters requirements such as
family notification, a waiting period, reporting requirements, and re-
view by the State Health Division constituted sufficient precautionary
measures to outweigh the common fear of abuse in favor of patient
autonomy.2 79 In general, the Act appealed to voters "who believe it is
a patient's prerogative to determine medical destiny, including
death."z' w Under the Oregon Act, the responsibility for assisted sui-
cide primarily lies with the patient: initiating a request for qualifica-
tion, obtaining the prescribed medication, and completing the final
act by ingesting the medication .2 8 Moreover, many voters viewed the
prohibition against lethal injections and active euthanasia as a means
to ensure that "suicide is the will of the patient" while limiting physi-
cian participation to the single act of writing a prescription. 8 2 There-
fore, the Act empowers a terminally ill patient to execute his or her
decision to commit suicide, rather than making the physician an im-
mediate participant. 283
The passage of the Oregon Act has also invoked strident criticisms.
Opponents assert that any form of physician participation in a pa-
tient's suicide is fundamentally inappropriate, regardless of the cir-
277. Id. § 3.09.
278. Id. § 3.11. The Oregon State Health Division convened to establish "emergency rules to
fulfill its record-gathering obligations under the law" prior to the intended effective date. Where
Does Measure 16 Stand Today?, OREOANss, Dec. 4, 1994, at A32.
279. See, e.g., Jann Mitchell, Two Men Facing Death Offer Opposing Views of Measure 16,
OREGONA, Nov. 13, 1994, at A16 (reporting the comment of Stacy R. Scott, diagnosed with
AIDS and lymphoma, that "he doesn't understand people's concern; the measure has so many
safeguards against impetuousness"); David Brown, Medical Community Still Divided on Ore-
gon's Assisted Suicide Act, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at A20 (interviewing Dr. Peter Good-
win, head of the Oregon Right to Die Committee, who called the law 'very tightly drafted and
very specific,' and added that 'nobody is going to dare to act in a cavalier, arrogant or negligent
way"'); and Susan W. Tolle, M.D., Measure 16: A Wake-Up Call to Medicine, OREGONLAN,
Nov. 13, 1994, at CI (stating that "Measure 16 is about a patient's desire for more control").
280. Mark O'Keefe et al., Oregon Agonizes on Moral Issues, OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 1994, at
B5.
281. Hubert, supra note 6, at Al. The article also reported that Dr. Leigh Dolin, President
of the Oregon Medical Association, made a pact with one of his terminally ill patients, William
E. Richayds, "that if Richards was near death and did not want to go on, he would prescribe the
necessary medications to end his patient's life." Id. Dr. Dolin stated that his "feeling is that the
patient should be the boss in these very personal decisions." Id.
282. Oregon's Experiment, SACRAMENTO BEa, Nov. 15, 1994, at B6.
283. Debate Didn't Die with Passage of Oregon's Assisted Suicide Law, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 14, 1994, at A8 (reporting the comment of Peter Goodwin, a Portland Oregon medical
physician, that "it is the patient who is empowered by this initiative and not the physician").
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cumstances.214 Although the Act requires psychiatric evaluation if
mental impairment is suspected, opponents maintain that suicide re-
quests may represent a "desperate plea for help by a distraught pa-
tient in physical or emotional pain." 28 Critics stress that
contemporary medical care should focus on alleviating pain and ad-
dressing the fears associated with dying, rather than providing assis-
tance in death.2 16
More specifically, the operation and application of the Oregon Act
in the context of persons with AIDS may present serious problems.
For example, patients who are either too weak or physically unable to
digest oral medications will be excluded from medically assisted death
under the Oregon proposal. As in the previous proposals, the patient's
terminal disease or illness is diagnosed and confirmed by physicians
who are not required to have special training in the field related to the
patient's underlying condition. Because AIDS is an immunosuppres-
sive disease, subject to secondary illnesses with differing degrees of
fatality, a legislative proposal for medically assisted suicide must be
broad enough to extend this option to people who are in the end
stages of the disease, but carefully crafted to avoid the mere diagnosis
of AIDS from qualifying as an operative illness under the act. The
following section will set forth improvements in the qualification
process and the procedure for providing medical assistance in death to
ensure the highest degree of protection for persons with AIDS who
seek medically assisted suicide.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR MEDICALLY ASSISTED SUICIDE LEGISLATION IN
THE CONTEXT OF AIDS: A MODEL DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
Using the heightened safeguards of the Oregon Act as a guide, this
Article presents a model proposal for a statutory right to medically
assisted suicide, applicable to terminally ill AIDS patients. Because of
284. Brown, supra note 279, at A20 (reporting the comment of Thomas Reardon, an Oregon
physician, that "[physicians should not be involved in the active demise of a patient"). Oppo-
nents also criticize the neutral stance taken by the Oregon Medical Association during the elec-
tion campaign. Mark O'Keefe, Suicide Vote Fits Oregon's Maverick Character, SAN JosE
MERcURY NEWS, Nov. 12, 1994, at IA (publishing the comment of Robert Castagna, head of
public-policy for Oregon's Roman Catholic Church, regarding the refusal of the Oregon Medical
Association to take a stand on the issue: "What other profession would not stand up for its own
ethics?"). One opponent, a pharmacy student, noted that the only novel aspect of the Oregon
Act in comparison to other state proposals "is that it shunts the responsibility of dispensing
lethal medications from the physician to the pharmacist." Michelle Frame Corvallis, Doctors
Pass Buck to Pharmacists, OREGONIAN, Nov. 18, 1994, at D12.
285. Don Colburn, Assisted Suicide Bill Passes, Oregon Law Puts State at Center of Ethical
De6ate, WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 1994, at Z9.
286. Id.
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public apprehension and current criminal penalties for aiding and
abetting suicide in many states, the model proposal is entitled the
"Model Death With Dignity Act," and uses the term "medically as-
sisted death" rather than medically assisted suicide. An enacting
clause or declaration of purpose is crucial for public comprehension
of the Model Act's purpose and the reasons for suggesting this type of
legislation. Therefore, the Model Act's principle stated purpose is the
recognition of self-determination and autonomy in medical treatment
decisions, including assistance upon request for a dignified and hu-
mane death. The previously summarized paradigm of concerns influ-
enced the sections in the Model Act, which include: 1) eligibility
requirements; 2) process for medically assisted death, including an ex-
plicit description of physician responsibilities; 3) procedural safe-
guards; and 4) immunities and liabilities under the Act. The Model
Act is presented in its entirety in the attached appendix28 and is here-
after discussed in a section-by-section analysis, focusing on the most
pertinent provisions and specific additions for persons with AIDS.
A. Eligibility: Qualified Patient Status
Under section one of the Model Act, a competent adult suffering
from a confirmed terminal condition has a right to medically assisted
death upon the execution of a valid directive. 288 The Model Act's eligi-
bility requirements vary from the previous state proposals in several
respects. The Model Act defines "terminal condition" as an incurable
and irreversible condition which will result in death within a relatively
short time, based upon a consensus of medical opinions. To allow
flexibility in the medical assessment of the patient's condition, and to
avoid an artificial time period for qualification, the Model Act uses
the phrase "relatively short time" rather than establishing a fixed time
period. Physicians may hesitate to make predictions about life expec-
tancy based upon a fixed standard, or may use the fixed period as a
default prognosis. The "relatively short time" standard respects con-
siderations such as the strength of the diagnosis, the type of the disor-
287. The Model Act introduced in this Article is intended as only an illustrative academic
presentation of the possible provisions for a comprehensive act relating to medically assisted
death and the concerns specific for persons with AIDS. Provisions from the proposals in Wash-
ington, California, Maine and Oregon were included verbatim in different sections and will be
referenced if specifically discussed in the text. Finally, the format of "The Oregon Death With
Dignity Act" was used for clarity and ease of discussion. For the full text of the Model Act, see
Appendix, infra.
288. The sample Directive in the Model Act was based upon the Oregon directive as provided
in Kane v. Attorney General, 871 P.2d 993, 1005-06 (Or. 1994) and added to "The Oregon
Death With Dignity Act" as Section 6, Form of the Request.
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der, and the reasonable judgment of physicians in making such
medical determinations. 219
Also, one must question the ability of physicians to render a medi-
cal opinion regarding the time at which an AIDS patient has only six
months to live. AIDS may clinically result in several crisis events
whereby a patient suffers an opportunistic infection or severe illness,
but ultimately recovers to merely an immunosuppressed status. The
recurrent cycle of devastating illness and subsequent recovery in-
creases the potential for an alarmist or premature diagnosis of immi-
nent death.290 In addition to vulnerability to a pessimistic medical
prognosis, an AIDS patient may also suffer from an irreversible op-
portunistic infection which some physicians may exclude from the cat-
egory of terminal condition, based upon inexperience or outdated
medical information. 291 Because of the complexity of AIDS and the
heightened possibility of inaccurate diagnoses, the Model Act requires
confirmation of the patient's "terminal condition" and prognosis by
two consulting physicians, one of whom must be a specialist in the
field pertaining to the terminal disease. Thus, the Model Act requires
heightened confirmation of the patient's diagnosis and prognosis
rather than adhering to a fixed time period for life expectancy.
For example, the Model Act would require an infectious disease
specialist or similar specialist, and one other consulting physician, to
confirm the prognosis and terminal condition of an AIDS patient. Al-
though this requirement will result in additional expense, the versatile
nature of AIDS and the differing fatalities of secondary diseases war-
rant a medical opinion based upon expertise in HIV infection and
AIDS. Confirmation by a specialist that the patient's condition will
result in death in a relatively short time should be based upon clinical
experience and management of patients suffering from the same type
of illness. A person with a depressed T-cell count may fall within the
CDC classification for a reportable AIDS case, while suffering none
289. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701 Historical Notes (West Supp. 1993) (using a
"relatively short time" standard in the Uniform Rights Of The Terminally IlI Act because the
"circumstances and inevitable variations in disorder and diagnosis make unrealistic a fixed time
period").
290. See supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text (describing the clinical manifestations of
HIV infection and AIDS).
291. See Macher, supra note 29, at 5-15 (listing the secondary diseases associated with
AIDS); Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 1237 (describing the process of HIV infection and the
various clinical manifestations associated with AIDS). Spencer Heinz, End Game, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 5, 1994, at Al (reporting the comment of Ann G. Jackson, Executive Director of the Ore-
gon Hospice Association, that "many doctors wait too long to make the six-month diagnosis
that opened the option of hospice care").
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of the symptoms of HIV infection or AIDS.292 The Model Act ensures
that such a patient would not qualify for medically assisted death
merely on the basis of an AIDS diagnosis. Each state should deter-
mine the qualifications necessary for a physician to fall within the cat-
egory of "specialist" for the purposes of the Act.
The qualification process imposes several duties upon the attending
physician who is responsible for the primary treatment and care of the
requesting patient. In addition to making the initial determination re-
garding the patient's eligibility, the attending physician must also ver-
ify that the patient is competent, and is making a voluntary request
for medically assisted death. The issue of competency is critical for
AIDS patients because of the increased occurrence of AIDS dementia
and the possibility of depression.2 93 Section 3.03 of the Model Act
mandates psychiatric or psychological counseling and evaluation if the
attending or consulting physicians suspect a mental disorder which
may impair the patient's judgment. Section 2.04 of the Model Act re-
quires the attending physician to inform the patient of his or her med-
ical diagnosis, prognosis, and the feasible alternatives to medically
assisted death, including such options as comfort care, hospice care
and pain control.94 As in the Maine proposal, assistance in death shall
be provided only if the physicians unanimously agree, within reasona-
ble medical judgment that the patient is competent, making a volun-
tary request, and has a terminal condition which will result in death in
a relatively short time. 9
Upon medical qualification, the attending physician must also ask
the patient to notify his or her family of the request for medically
assisted death. As in the Oregon Act, this requirement is permissive,
and refusal or failure to notify family members does not provide a
basis for denying the implementation of a valid directive. 29 Fear of
family disapproval or coercion to rescind a medical assistance direc-
tive may compel a person with AIDS or a terminal illness to reject
292. See supra notes 29-32, 39-40 and accompanying text (describing the 1993 CDC Classifi-
cation for AIDS cases including T-cell counts of less than 200 cells per microliter of blood).
293. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (describing the incidence of AIDS demen-
tia for HIV-positive individuals).
294. This requirement is based upon the provision in the Oregon proposal for "Attending
Physician Responsibilities." See THE OREGON DEATH WIT DIGNITY ACT, Initiative Measure §
3.01(2) (Dec. 14, 1993).
295. See Proposed amendment to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-715 (West 1993); L.D.
1420, 116th Leg,, 1st Sess. (Me. 1993) (requiring medical confirmation by attending physician
and two consulting physicians of patient's eligibility for medically assisted death).
296. See TuE OREG, ON DEATH WITH DorrY AcT, Initiative Measure § 3.05 (Dec. 14, 1993)
(mandating a physician request for patient to notify next of kin, but allowing the patient right to
refuse such notification).
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family notification. The patient's right to refuse family notification
may be very important in the context of AIDS patients. For homosex-
ual persons with AIDS, fears of family intrusion and exclusion of a
partner at the time of medically assisted death may provide a plausible
basis for rejecting such a suggestion.2 97 A person has the right not only
to elect medical assistance under the Model Act, but also to control
who will be notified of the execution of such an option. The permis-
sive notification of family members is a crucial protection of the pa-
tient's autonomy and right to privacy under the Model Act.
B. Implementation of Medically Assisted Death: Physician
Involvement
The Model act provides for the implementation of medically as-
sisted death through voluntary physician participation and involve-
ment. In an effort to curtail public apprehension regarding physicians
as sanctioned killers for the state, section 2.03 of the Model Act pro-
vides that no attending physician shall be under any duty to partici-
pate in a qualified patient's request for medically assisted death. The
Act requires a physician who, at any time, is unable or unwilling to
participate in a qualified patient's request to inform the patient of his
or her reluctance to participate in the execution of a directive. Pursu-
ant to the patient's request, the attending physician must refer the pa-
tient and related medical records to a new attending physician. Unlike
the previously discussed proposals, the Model Act provides a specific
section for patient referral in the event an attending physician refuses
to participate in a patient's request for medically assisted death. 29
8
Upon qualification for medically assisted death, section 2.05 of the
Model Act imposes a waiting period of a least seven days between the
date of the patient's qualification and the execution of a medical assis-
tance directive. This allows time for the qualified patient to reflect on
the feasible alternatives, the option for family notification, and the
possibility that the request may be premature. After the waiting pe-
297. Miriam Horn, Grief Re-examined, U.S. NEws & WoRvD REP., June 14, 1993, at 81, 82
(explaining that gay lovers "may be locked out of memorials, denied access to shared belong-
ings, or remains" by their partner's families).
298. The legalization of medically assisted death would occur under the Model Act through
either a statutory enactment or initiative measure. A scenario where no physicians would be
willing to participate in a patient's request for medically assisted death is not likely to occur.
Moreover, the surveys mentioned in this Article regarding physician reaction to assistance in
death evidence a positive inclination under certain circumstances. For example, the Oregon Med-
ical Association "refused to take a position on the state-assisted suicide initiative," measure 16
on the November 1994 ballot. Dobbin, supra note 98, at A14. This decision by the Oregon
Medical Association conflicts with the position of the American Medical Association, "which
1994]
426 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:369
riod, the qualified patient decides when and where assistance in death
will occur.
Under the Model Act, the patient has the right to die with medical
assistance at home or in a clinical setting. The Model Act recognizes
that "death with dignity" must include a provision which allows ter-
minal patients to choose to die in familiar surroundings. The personal
accounts of "Dean," Steven Shiflett and Dr. Green's patient illustrate
the importance that these men placed on being at home, surrounded
by friends and family, in their final moments.29 It makes little sense
to provide the right to medically assisted death, yet mandate that the
location for such assistance must be in the clinical setting of a hospi-
tal. The patient's right to seek medically assisted death must also in-
clude the right to decide where such assistance will occur.
Prior to the delivery of medical assistance in death, the attending
physician must verify that the qualified patient is making an informed
request, and provide an opportunity for the patient to revoke the re-
quest prior to the actual execution of the directive. Unlike most of the
state proposals, the Model Act provides medically assisted death
through a prescription for oral or intravenous medication, depending
upon the physical condition of the patient.)° Although the prospect of
a physician administering a lethal dose of medication invokes an im-
age of a medical killer sanctioned by the state, assistance in death
must include physician administration in order to extend this option
to some persons with AIDS. Many patients suffering from AIDS or
other terminal illnesses experience a collapse of the digestive system
which necessitates an option for intravenous administration. 0 ' There-
remains opposed to such proposals." Id. The fact that the Oregon Medical Association elected
not to oppose the initiative measure for medically assisted death evidences some degree of physi-
cian support for this option. See Assisted Suicide Medicine Will Change Stance, SEA-rr Tn&Es,
May 20, 1994, at B7 (editorial by William 0. Robertson, M.D., stating that the decision of the
Oregon Medical Association signifies a change in attitude toward assisting terminal patients in
hastening their deaths). Following the November election, the Oregon Medical Association's End
of Life Task Force began assessing "what guidance to give its members in complying with the
new law," indicating anticipated physician support and participation in patients requests for
assistance in death. Where Does Measure 16 Stand Today?, cs .ottmss, Dec. 4, 1994, at A32.
299. See supra notes 64-91 and accompanying text (providing the personal accounts of
"Dean," Steven Shiflett, and Dr. Green's patient).
300. See Howard Brody, M.D., Ph.D., Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response to a
Medical Failure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1386 (1992) (describing defensibility of medically
assisted death through patient and physician administration depending upon the condition of the
patient).
301. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (describing the "botched" suicide attempt
of Steven Shiflett due in part to his weakened digestive system). Dr. Pelter Admiraal, experi-
enced in euthanasia in the Netherlands, explained the problem with limiting assistance in death
to only oral medications: "We estimated 20 to 30 percent [of the patients) in the Netherlands
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fore, section 2.05 of the Model Act provides a hierarchy of physician
involvement which increases as the patient's physical condition deteri-
orates.
Following a patient's decision that the time for medically assisted
death has arrived, the attending physician must assess the patient's
physical ability to effectively digest oral medications. If the patient is
able to digest oral medication, the physician shall prescribe oral medi-
cation for self-administration by the patient. If the patient is physi-
cally unable to digest oral medication, then the attending physician
must prescribe intravenous medication as the means for medically as-
sisted death. The physician shall assist the patient in administering the
intravenous medication if the patient is mentally and physically able
to participate in the administration. This alternative envisions the de-
livery of an intravenous medication mixture over a short period of
time under the patient's control, rather than one instantaneous lethal
injection. In this manner, the patient will succumb after sufficient in-
fusion of the sedative mixture and thus remove the physician from the
immediacy of a lethal injection. Finally, if the patient lacks the physi-
cal and mental ability to participate, the physician shall control the
infusion rate of the medication until death occurs.
The continuum of physician involvement is based upon the patient's
ability to control all aspects of his or her death. When physically and
mentally capable, the patient controls the actual administration of the
prescribed medication and thus, the actual time of death.3°2 The alter-
native for physician administration may invoke a critical reaction, but
the inclusion of such an option is crucial for persons with AIDS and
other terminal illnesses. The option of intravenous administration rec-
ognizes the right of all terminal patients to receive medical assistance
in death, even those who cannot digest oral medication. If a statute
provided for medical assistance in death through no other means than"
oral medication, it might subtly coerce patients to opt for medically
assisted death prematurely, because of fear of disqualification at a
later time when oral medication could be ineffective. The concept of
death with dignity must include individuals who seek assistance in
cannot swallow, or they vomit it up .... Well, what do you do then? We know that in the
Netherlands we can use an injection. Of course, you can't do that in Oregon." Mark O'Keefe &
Patrick O'Neill, Dutch Researcher Warns Of Lingering Deaths, OREGONAN, Dec. 4, 1994, at
Al.
302. See Cosper, supra note 60, at A3 (reporting the comment of euthanasia advocate
Jeanne Tromp Meesters that AIDS patients requesting assistance in death "are young people,
and they take their lives in their own hands .... They know what is ahead of them, that there is
no hope").
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death, but choose to live with the dying process beyond their ability to
ingest oral medication. A statutory right must focus on the patient's
wishes rather than the physician's degree of participation.
C. Safeguards and Precautions
The Model Act includes additional safeguards in an effort to ad-
dress the paradigm of concerns regarding medically assisted death.
Section 3.08 of the Model Act requires the attending physician to doc-
ument each phase of the qualification process in the patient's medical
record. Also, the state must establish an annual record review process
and a confidential reporting procedure, which must include the name
of a patient who dies as a result of medical assistance, the assisting
physician or health care provider, the terminal illness, and the date,
time and place of death. These requirements provide the basis for sta-
tistical analysis of the utilization of medically assisted death, the pre-
cipitating illnesses, and a tracking mechanism for possible abuses in
the process. Reporting and review requirements would operate as an
adjunct to the eligibility requirements, minimizing the potential for
coercion and abuse in the implementation of medically assisted death
for persons with AIDS and other terminal illnesses.
As in the Oregon Act and the California proposal, section 2.02(4)
of the Model Act provides that a patient in a long term care facility
seeking to execute a "medical assistance directive" shall have as one
witness, an individual with qualifications specified by the appropriate
state agency overseeing nursing homes and extended care facilities. 303
This provision ensures that patients with AIDS or other terminal ill-
nesses are not coerced by family pressure or health care costs to seek
medically assisted death. The high costs associated with extended care
may subtly coerce an AIDS patient to opt for assistance in death in
order to preserve the financial security of his or her family. °4 The
inevitable fatality of AIDS and the high costs of custodial care in-
crease the likelihood that these patients may be disproportionately
303. Cf. Proposed CAL. Civ. CoDE § 2525.4 (1992), reprinted in OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF
STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, Proposition 161 68 (1992) (requiring special witness ap-
proved by the Department of Aging for directive executed in a skilled nursing facility); and THE
ORGOON DEATH WITS DIGNITY ACT, Initiative Measure § 2.02 (4) (Dec. 14, 1993) (providing
exact language used in the Model Act).
304. See Reichel & Dyck, supra note 200, at 1322 (postulating that patients may perceive
their protracted illness as "causing a financial and emotional hardship on the loved ones" which
would end with the selection of assistance in death); see also Gifford, supra note 201, at 1562-63
(describing that the coercion for terminally ill patients may be subtle and unspoken, but hinted
at by families as an alternative).
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counseled about the availability of assistance in death. 0 5 Heightened
safeguards are necessary for such patients to ensure that requests for
assistance in death are not based upon subtle coercion, financial con-
cerns, or insinuations that their incapacitation warrants such an elec-
tion.
Additionally, section 4 of the Model Act provides that any person
or physician who coerces or exerts undue influence on a patient to
execute a medical assistance directive shall be guilty of a class A fel-
ony or equivalent crime in the enacting state. The same penalty results
for destroying or concealing a revocation of a request for medically
assisted death. A physician who qualifies a patient in the absence of a
terminal condition or upon clinical indication of a psychiatric or psy-
chological disorder shall be subject to licensure revocation and prose-
cution for a class A felony. These provisions serve to deter the
possibility of involuntary selection of persons with AIDS or other ter-
minal illnesses, and ensure compliance with the qualification process
for all requesting patients.
Under section 3.01 of the Model Act, the requesting patient must
also be a resident of the state in order to qualify for medically assisted
death.30 6 Upon the passage of the "Death With Dignity Act," the en-
acting state may attract an influx of terminally ill patients who cannot
legally receive assistance in death in their state of residency.2 7 The
actual demand for such an option cannot be adequately estimated on
a national level, but medical studies indicate that obtaining assistance
in death is an increasing concern for persons with AIDS and other
terminal illnesses .1 This limitation would operate as protection for
the state by minimizing the potential for over-utilization of the state's
305. Gaylin, sudtra note 9, at 2140 (arguing that the "[h]igh costs of care for the old and
incurable already tempt some physicians to regard as 'dispensable' some patients who never ex-
press the wish to die"); see also 'Dr. Death' Is No Angel of Mercy, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov.
29, 1992, at 33 (arguing that "there's always a possibility that the patient, however inadver-
tently, will get the idea that AIDS has such a high cost for the individual, the family and society
as a whole that suicide is the better alternative").
306. Based upon § 3.10 of the Oregon proposal. THE OREGON DEATH WrrH DIGNITY ACT,
Initiative Measure § 3.10 (Dec. 14, 1993). Because a residency requirement for a statute permit-
ting medical assistance in death has not been challenged in any state thus far, the constitutional-
ity of a resident requirement in this situation is unknown. Therefore, the Model Act includes a
severability clause in section 5 which provides that an invalidated provision shall not affect any
remaining sections of the Act which can be given full effect in the absence of the invalid provi-
sion.
307. See Michael Betzold, State Regulation Could Ensure Dignified End for Those in Pain,
DET. FREE Paass, Sept. 20, 1992, at IF (providing a parody of Michigan in the year 1997 follow-
ing the enactment of assisted suicide and postulating an influx of 2000 non-residents annually to
a state purporting to be "[al great place to live, a peaceful place to die").
308. See supra notes 15-26, 50-98 and accompanying text (explaining that public support for
medically assisted suicide is increasing, especially among persons with AIDS).
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health care services immediately following the enactment of such a
right.
Moreover, the requirements for reporting and annual review of
medically assisted deaths are critical protections against the potential
for abuses in the process. A rapid influx of non-resident patients may
impede the initial monitoring and evaluation procedure adopted by
the state and consequently decrease the effectiveness of such precau-
tions. The Model Act seeks to provide a right to medically assisted
death with heightened protections against the potential for coercion,
involuntary selection, and clandestine assistance in death as seen in
the practices of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Therefore, the state's interest in
maintaining responsible administration and effective record review
should outweigh the interest of non-residents who may have a compel-
ling medical basis for seeking medically assisted death.3°9
As in the California and Oregon proposals, section 3.10 of the
Model Act ensures that the execution of a medical assistance directive
shall have no effect upon the validity of a qualified patient's health,
life or accident insurance policy.110 Section 4 provides that actions
taken in accordance with the Model Act shall not constitute suicide,
assisted suicide, mercy killing, or homicide under current laws. Physi-
cians and health care providers shall not be subject to civil or criminal
liability or professional disciplinary action for participating in good
faith compliance with the provisions of the Model Act. Recognizing
the possibility of moral and ethical opposition to assisting a patient's
death, physicians and health care providers have no duty to provide
assistance, but must transfer or refer a requesting patient to an ac-
commodating physician or facility. Through these safeguards, the
Model Act attempts to minimize the possibility of discrimination and
abuse for persons with AIDS or any other terminal illness who qualify
for medical assistance in death.
309. The traditional state interests, including preservation of human life, preventing suicide,
protecting innocent third parties, and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession
should outweigh the interest of nonresidents in seeking medically assisted suicide in the event of
a constitutional challenge. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. R'ptr. 2d 59, 62 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
310. See Proposed CAL. Crv. CODE § 2525.17 (1992), reprinted in Otwica oF SECRETAR OF'
STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, Proposition 161 68, 69 (1992) (providing similar restric-
tions on the issuance and premiums for insurance in relation to the administration of aid in
dying); THE OREGoN DEATH WiT DIGNrTY ACT, Initiative Measure § 3.13 (Dec. 14, 1993) (pro-
viding substantially the same language as the Model Act regarding insurance restrictions). Be-
cause such an insurance restriction in a statute permitting medical assistance in death has not
been challenged in any state thus far, the constitutionality of such a restriction on the insurance
industry is unknown. Therefore, the Model Act includes a severability clause in section 5 which
provides that an invalidated provision shall not affect any remaining sections of the act which
can be given full effect in the absence of the invalid provision.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article presents the Model Act as an invitation to consider the
ramifications of legalized medical assistance in death for persons with
AIDS. The suffering of terminally ill AIDS patients gives rise to some
of the most compassionate and compelling arguments in support of
medically assisted suicide. The personal accounts presented in this Ar-
ticle demonstrate the severe and debilitating effects of AIDS, and the
rational prospect of deciding to shorten one's death under excruciat-
ing and protracted circumstances. Such accounts support the premise
that the right to die must include an option for death with dignity in
the absence of life-sustaining treatment if self-determination and au-
tonomy are to have practical meaning and effect. Yet legislative pro-
posals must be carefully drafted to ensure that societal pressure is not
exerted upon people suffering from terminal illnesses to opt for medi-
cally assisted suicide based merely upon their medical diagnosis or fi-
nancial situation, rather than their personal choice.
Persons with AIDS may be particularly vulnerable to duress, coer-
cion, or subtle societal pressure to opt for medically assisted death due
to the extremely high costs of treating AIDS, the stigma associated
with HIV infection and AIDS, and the inevitable fatality from the
disease. Moreover, the likelihood of developing some form of AIDS
dementia complex makes persons with this disease even more suscepti-
ble to subtle pressure regarding the election of medically assisted
death. Stringent qualification requirements, thorough competency as-
sessments, and precise implementation procedures are necessary to
protect all terminally ill persons, especially those suffering from
AIDS.
Although a strong argument exists that the constitutional rationale
in the "right-to-die" cases should also encompass decisions to end
one's life, the judiciary cannot effectively ensure the safe and respon-
sible implementation of medically assisted death on a case-by-case ba-
sis. The paradigm of concerns summarized in this Article warrant the
provision of medical assistance in death through a statutory enact-
ment to ensure, at a minimum, consistency in application and appro-
priate review. The Model Act addresses the primary factors that
mandate consideration in any legislative proposal intended to legalize
medical assistance in death.
The process in the Model Act for obtaining medical assistance in
death is cautious, comprehensive and expensive. A major deficiency
of this proposal is its hidden requirement for qualification: substantial
amounts of money. Under the Model Act, only patients with suffi-
cient finances could afford the fees of a consulting physician, a spe-
cialist's consultation, and the possibility of psychiatric evaluation or
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psychological counseling. However, a statute legalizing assistance in
death must include requirements to ensure proper diagnosis and evalu-
ation of AIDS patients. The consequence of limiting the option of
medical assistance in death to financially secure terminally ill patients
appears too discriminatory to comport with the notion of individual
autonomy and self-determination. But this is the reality of attempting
legislation in this area.
Although the legal sufficiency of the procedures, safeguards and
application of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act is undetermined at
the present time, the passage of the Act evidences increasing public
support for medically assisted death or suicide under specific circum-
stances. Nevertheless, because of the potential for abuses in a process
designed to hasten death, the prospect of legalizing such an option
induces hesitation. The analysis of the right-to-die cases indicates that
a state should be able to enact a statute establishing the right to medi-
cally assisted death that would withstand a constitutional challenge.
However, to enact a statutory right to medical assistance in death, the
voting public must conclude that such a change in public policy is
both warranted and correct. Thus, to ensure the integrity of such a
process, a legislative proposal or ballot initiative must provide ex-
tremely heightened, and thereby expensive, protections against abuse
and discrimination. When a legislative proposal incorporates the ideal
combination of stringent eligibility requirements, optimal safeguards,
and responsible enforcement, the right to medically assisted suicide
may become a legal option for persons with AIDS and other terminal
illnesses who competently and voluntarily seek release from terminal
suffering.
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APPENDIX
MODEL DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
PROVIDING MEDICALLY ASSISTED DEATH
SECTION 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
The following words and phrases, when used in this Act, shall have
the following meaning:
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician who has primary re-
sponsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
(2) "Consulting physician" means a physician who is qualified by spe-
cialty or experience to make a professional diagnosis and prognosis of
the patient's condition.
(3) "Counseling" means a consultation between a state licensed psy-
chiatrist or psychologist and a patient for the purpose of determining
whether the patient is suffering from a psychiatric or psychological
disorder or depression causing impaired judgment.
(4) "Declarant" means a person who executes a directive in accor-
dance with this Act.
(5) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily executed by the
declarant in accordance with the requirements of Section 2 of this
Act.
(6) "Health care facility" means a hospital, nursing home, home
health agency, or hospice.
(7) "Health care provider" means a person licensed, certified, or oth-
erwise authorized or permitted by the law of this State to administer
health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profes-
sion, and includes a health care facility.
(8) "Informed decision" means a decision by a qualified patient, to
request and obtain medication to end his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner, that is based on an appreciation of the relevant
facts and being fully informed by the attending physician of:
(a) his or her medical diagnosis;
(b) his or her prognosis;
(c) the feasible alternatives, including, but not limited
to, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.
(9) "Medically assisted death" means a prescription for oral or intra-
venous medication that will end the life of a patient and has been re-
quested, authorized, prescribed, and administered in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
(10) "Medically confirmed" means the medical opinion of the attend-
ing physician has been confirmed by two consulting physicians, one of
whom is a specialist in the area relating to the terminal condition of
the patient, who have examined the patient and the patient's relevant
medical records.
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(11) "Qualified patient" means a mentally competent person at least
18 years of age who meets the following requirements:
(a) is a resident of this state;
(b) has voluntarily executed a written Directive as defined in this
section;
(c) has a terminal condition as verified by the attending physician
and two consulting physicians in writing; and,
(d) has expressed an informed request for medical assistance to end
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
(12) "Terminal condition" means an incurable and irreversible condi-
tion, that has been medically confirmed and will, in the written opi-
nions of the attending physician and consulting physicians, result in
death within a relatively short time.
SECTION 2: DIRECTIVE AND PROCESS FOR MEDICALLY
ASSISTED DEATH
SECTION 2.01 ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICALLY ASSISTED DEATH DIRECTIVE
An adult who is competent, is a resident of this state, and has been
determined by the attending physician and two consulting physicians
to be suffering from a terminal condition, and who has voluntarily
expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medi-
cation for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and digni-
fied manner in accordance with this Act.
SECTION 2.02 WRITTEN DIRECTIVE REQUIREMENTS
(1) A valid request for medication under this Act shall be signed and
dated by the patient and witnessed by two individuals who, in the
presence of the patient, attest that to the best of their knowledge and
belief the patient is capable, acting voluntarily, and is not being co-
erced to the sign the request. The Directive must be made on the fol-
lowing form:
DIRECTIVE FOR MEDICALL Y ASSISTED DEATH
I, , am an adult of sound mind. I am
suffering from , which in the opinion of
my attending physician, is a terminal condition. Terminal condition
means a condition that is incurable and irreversible and that, in the
opinion of my attending physician, is likely to result in death in a
relatively short time. I understand that my physician will not be able
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to assist me unless my terminal condition is confirmed by two consult-
ing physicians, one of whom must be a specialist in the field of my
terminal condition. I have been fully informed of my diagnosis, prog-
nosis, the nature of the medication to be prescribed or administered
and the potential risks, the expected result, and the feasible alterna-
tives, including comfort care, hospice care and pain control. In order
that I may die in a dignified, painless and humane manner, I have
voluntarily elected to obtain medically assisted death. INITIAL ONE
SELECTION: - I have informed my family of my decision. __
I have decided not to inform my family of my decision. - I have
no family to inform of my decision. I understand that a waiting pe-
riod of seven (7) days must occur after my verbal request for the exe-
cution of this directive in order to ensure that my decision is final. I
understand that I have the right to revoke this directive at any time
and that if I revoke this directive, I will have to make a new directive
if I again choose medically assisted death. I understand the full import
of this request and I expect to die when I take or receive the medica-
tion prescribed. I make this request voluntarily and without reserva-
tion.
Signed this day of
Signature:
Address:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Number:
DECLARATION OF WITNESSES
We declare that the person signing this request: (a) Has provided
proof of identity; (b) Appears to be of sound mind; (c) Signed this
request voluntarily and in our presence; (d) Is not a patient for whom
either of us is attending physician.
Witness 1: Date: _
Witness 2: Date: _
(2) One of the witnesses shall be a person who is not:
(a) A relative of the patient by blood, marriage, or adoption;
(b) A person who at the time the request is signed would be entitled
to any portion of the estate of the qualified patient upon death under
any will or by operation of law; or
(c) An owner, operator or employee of a health care facility where
the qualified patient is receiving medical treatment or is a resident.
(3) The patient's attending physician at the time the request is signed
shall not be a witness.
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(4) If the patient is a patient in a long term care facility at the time the
written request is made, one of the witnesses shall be an individual
designated by the facility and having qualifications specified by the
state department responsible for supervision of such facilities.
SECTION 2.03 VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN
(1) No attending physician shall be under any duty to participate in a
qualified patient's request for medically assisted death, as provided in
Section 4 of this Act.
(2) If, at any time, an attending physician is unable or unwilling to
carry out a qualified patient's request under this Act, the attending
physician shall:
(a) Immediately inform the patient that the attending physician is
unable or unwilling to carry out the patient's request under this Act;
(b) Refer the patient, upon request, to a new attending physician;
(c) Transfer, upon request, a copy of the patient's medical records
to the new attending physician.
SECTION 2.04 ATTENDING PHYSICIAN PRELIMINARY RESPONSIBILITIES
The attending physician shall:
(1) Make the initial determination of whether the patient has a termi-
nal condition, is competent, had has made the request voluntarily.
(2) Inform the patient of:
(a) his or her medical diagnosis;
(b) his or her prognosis;
(c) the feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort
care, hospice care, and pain control.
(3) Refer the patient to two consulting physicians, one of whom must
be a specialist in the field relating to the patient's terminal condition,
for:
(a) medical confirmation of the patient's medical diagnosis and
prognosis through a physical examination of the patient and a review
of the patient's medical record; and
(b) a determination that the patient is competent and acting volun-
tarily.
(4) Refer the patient for counseling if, in the opinion of the attending
physician or consulting physicians, the patient appears to be suffering
from a psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depression causing
impaired judgment. Medication to end a patient's life in a humane
and dignified manner shall not be prescribed until the person perform-
ing the counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a
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psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depression causing impaired
judgment.
(5) Request that the patient notify next of kin.
(6) Inform the patient that he or she has the right to revoke the writ-
ten Directive at any time, and in any manner.
(7) Fulfill the medical record documentation requirements of Section
3.08.
SECTION 2.05 ATTENDING PfYsicIAN RESPONSIBMITIES FOR EXECUTION
OF DIRECTIVE
(1) Following receipt of written medical confirmation of the declar-
ant's terminal condition, competence, and voluntary request for medi-
cally assisted death by two consulting physicians, the attending
physician shall:
(a) make the Directive and written medical confirmation a part of
the patient's medical record; and
(b) inform the patient of the medical confirmation and compliance
of the Directive with the requirements of this Act.
(2) The qualified patient shall make the determination that the time
for medically assisted death has arrived and shall communicate this
decision to the attending physician following the medical and psychi-
atric or psychological confirmation if applicable.
(a) No less than seven (7) days shall elapse between the medical con-
firmation of the patient's eligibility and the execution of a valid Direc-
tive for medically assisted death;
(b) After the seven day period, a qualified patient may request med-
ically assisted death and the attending physician shall execute the Di-
rective subject to the provisions in Section 2.03.
(c) The patient shall select the place in which medically assisted
death will occur which may include, but is not limited to, a private
residence or health care facility.
(d) The attending physician shall verify that the qualified patient is
making an informed decision and shall provide an opportunity for the
qualified patient to revoke the request for medically assisted death
prior to actual execution of the Directive.
(3) The attending physician shall determine if the patient is physically
able to ingest prescribed oral medication as the means for medically
assisted death and the following process for administration shall be
followed based on the outcome of the attending physician's assess-
ment at the time the qualified patient has completed all of the require-
ments of this Act and determined the time for actual execution of the
Directive:
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(a) If the attending physician determines that the qualified patient is
able to digest oral medications, then medical assistance in death shall
be provided by a prescription for oral medication and shall be admin-
istered by the patient;
(b) If the attending physician determines that the qualified patient is
mentally alert but unable to digest oral medication, then medical assis-
tance in death shall be provided through intravenous medication. The
physician or health care provider shall assist the patient in the admin-
istration of the prescribed medication;
(c) If the attending physician determines that the qualified patient is
physically or mentally unable to administer the intravenous medica-
tion, then the physician or health care provider shall perform the ad-
ministration of the medication to provide medically assisted death.
(4) The attending physician shall complete the death certificate of a
qualified patient by listing medically assisted death and the underlying
terminal condition as the cause of death.
SECTION 3: SAFEGUARDS
SECTION 3.01 RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Only requests by residents of this state shall be granted.
SECTION 3.02 CONSULTING PHYSICIAN CONFIRMATION
Before a patient is qualified under this Act, two consulting physi-
cians shall examine the patient, one of whom shall be a specialist in
the field relating to the patient's terminal condition. Both consulting
physicians shall confirm, in writing, the attending physician's diagno-
sis that the patient is suffering from a terminal condition, and verify
that the patient is competent, is acting voluntarily and has made an
informed decision.
SECTION 3.03 COUNSELING REFERRAL
If in the opinion of the attending physician or either of the consult-
ing physicians, the patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psy-
chological disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment, any
physician shall refer the patient for counseling. Medication to end a
patient's life in a humane and dignified manner shall not be pre-
scribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the
patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder,
or depression causing impaired judgment.
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SECTION 3.04 INFORMED DECISION
No person shall receive a prescription for medication to end his or
her life in a humane and dignified manner unless he or she has made
an informed decision as defined in Section 1 (8). Immediately prior to
providing a prescription for medication under this Act, the attending
physician shall verify that the patient is making an informed decision.
SECTION 3.05 FAMILY NOTIFICATION
The attending physician shall ask the qualified patient to notify next
of kin of his or her request for medication pursuant to this Act. A
qualified patient who declines or is unable to notify next of kin shall
not have his or her request denied for that reason.
SECTION 3.06 WAITING PERIOD
No less than seven (7) days shall elapse between the medical confir-
mation of the patient's eligibility for medically assisted death and the
execution of a Directive under this Act. The qualified patient shall
notify the physician that he or she has decided that the time for medi-
cally assisted death has arrived and indicate the location where medi-
cal assistance shall occur.
SECTION 3.07 RIGHT TO REVOKE REQUEST
A qualified patient may revoke his or her request at any time and in
any manner without regard to his or her mental state. No prescription
for medication under this Act may be written without the attending
physician offering the qualified patient a right to revoke the request.
If the qualified patient does revoke the request, the attending physi-
cian shall be responsible for immediately removing the written direc-
tive and medical confirmation from the patient's chart. The patient
shall be required to comply with the entire process in order to become
eligible for medically assisted death following a revocation of a prior
written Directive.
SECTION 3.08 MEDICAL RECORD DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
The following shall be documented in the patient's medical record:
(1) A written Directive for medically assisted death signed by the pa-
tient and two attesting witnesses;
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(2) The attending physician's written diagnosis, prognosis and verifi-
cation that the patient is competent, acting voluntarily and has made
an informed decision;
(3) The consulting physicians' written medical confirmation of the pa-
tient's diagnosis, prognosis and verification that the patient is compe-
tent, acting voluntarily and has made an informed decision;
(4) A report of the outcome and determinations made during counsel-
ing, if performed;
(5) The attending physician's offer to the patient to revoke his or her
request prior to the actual execution of the Directive; and
(6) A notation by the attending physician indicating that all require-
ments under this Act have been met and indicating the means selected
for medically assisted death based upon the patient's physical and
mental condition on the date of execution of the Directive.
SECTION 3.09 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
(1) The state health department or designated state agency shall an-
nually review a sample of records pursuant to this Act.
(2) The state health department or designated state agency shall make
rules to facilitate the collection of information regarding compliance
with this Act and ensure the confidentiality of such information, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the name of the requesting patient, the
assisting physician or health care provider, the terminal condition,
and the date, time and place of death. The information collected shall
not be a public record and shall not be available for inspection by the
public.
(3) The state health department or designated state agency shall gener-
ate and make available to the public an annual statistical report of the
information collected under this Act.
SECTION 3.10 INSURANCE OR ANNUITY POLICIES
The sale, procurement, or issuance of any life, health, or accident
insurance or annuity policy or the rate charged for any policy shall
not be conditioned upon or affected by the making or revoking of a
request, by a qualified patient, for medication to end his or her life in
a humane and dignified manner. Neither shall a qualified patient's act
of ingesting or receiving intravenous medication to end his or her life
in a humane and dignified manner have an effect upon a health, life
or accident insurance or annuity policy.
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SECTION 4: IMMUNITIES AND LIABILITIES
SECTION 4.01 Im uNiTIEs
Except as provided under Section 4.02:
(1) No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability or profes-
sional disciplinary action for participating in good faith compliance
with this Act. This includes being present when a qualified patient
takes prescribed medication or administering the prescribed medica-
tion to the qualified patient to end his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner.
(2) No health care provider shall be under any duty to participate in
the provision to a qualified patient of medication to end his or her life
in a humane and dignified manner. If a health care provider is unable
or unwilling to carry out a patient's request under this Act, and the
patient transfers his or her care to a new health care provider, the
prior health care provider shall transfer, upon request, a copy of the
patient's medical records to the new health care provider.
SECTION 4.02 LIABILITIES
(1) A person who, without authorization of the patient, willfully alters
or forges a Directive for medication or conceals or destroys a revoca-
tion of a Directive with intent or effect of causing a patient's death
shall be guilty of a Class A felony.
(2) A person who coerces or exerts undue influence on a patient to
complete a Directive for ending the patient's life, or to destroy a revo-
cation of such a request, shall be guilty of a Class A felony.
(3) A physician who coerces or exerts undue influence on a patient or
conspires to validate a Directive either (a) in the absence of a valid
terminal condition or (b) upon clinical indication of a psychiatric or
psychological disorder in the patient shall be subject to licensure revo-
cation in this state and shall be guilty of a Class A felony.
SECTION 5: SEVERABILITY
Any section of this Act being held invalid as to any person or cir-
cumstance shall not affect the application of any other section of this
Act which can be given full effect without the invalid section or appli-
cation.
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